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PREFACE 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to explore and analyze the circumstances 
surrounding the Treaty Three agreement between the Canadian government and the 
Anishinabe in 1873. The agreement is important for a number of reasons. The Anishinabe 
won significant concessions from Canada that, not only led to the renegotiation of Treaties 
One and Two, but set the standard for the rest of the numbered treaties across Western 
Canada as well. It is helpful to remember that while most of the other numbered treaties 
were signed in a matter of weeks, Treaty Three was over four years in the making. The 
Anishinabe realized the value of their land and insisted on key demands from the Dominion 
government. They remained committed to their basic position from 1869 when they first 
issued a copy of their demands to the Canadian government until 1873 when they finally 
signed Treaty Three. These demands went far beyond what Indian agents were commissioned 
by the Canadian cabinet to agree to. The Anishinabe realized this and held up the talks until 
they could negotiate with a representative of the Queen, who they believed had the authority 
to deal with their demands. In 1873, they received such an individual in Alexander Morris, 
the Lieutenant-Governor of Manitoba and the North-West Territories. The Anishinabe could 
not have realized at the time that Morris’ instructions were as narrow as the other 
representatives who had earlier attempted to negotiate a treaty with them. 
It is not surprising that Morris has received much of the credit for negotiating Treaty 
Three which had eluded the Canadian government since the Riel Resistance. However, a 
careful examination of the available evidence suggests that the agreement was made possible 
by the work of Simon Dawson and his associates Richard Pither and Nicholas Chatelain on 
one hand and James McKay and other Metis leaders of the Red River community who 
accompanied Morris to Lake of the Woods in 1873. This paper argues that it was a 
combination of these two factors, the rank that Morris enjoyed in the eyes of the Anishinabe 
and the role played Dawson, McKay and the rest of the Canadian negotiating team that led to 
the successful agreement in 1873. 
In the 1870’s, Canadian officials referred to the Anishinabe as the Saulteaux. There is 
no evidence available that suggests that they ever called themselves by this term. 
Nevertheless, all of the primary and many of the secondary sources use the word Saulteaux, 
so, for sake of consistency and in order to avoid confusion, I have decided to use it 
throughout this paper. 
This paper would not have been made possible without the support and encouragement 
of many people. I would like to expressed my thanks to members of the History department 
at Lakehead University including Professors Smith, Zimmermann and Jasen who have always 
created stimulating atmospheres for me both in and outside of the classroom. 
I would especially like to thank Dr. A. E. Epp who works tirelessly on behalf of the 
Lakehead University community and still makes time to offer his keen insights to students. 
And to my thesis supervisor Dr. Bruce Muirhead who knows the value of finishing a 
project like this. Without him, I would still be sitting in the library reading about Treaty 
Three. 
During the research stage of this thesis, I was fortunate to meet many people who 
have helped me more than I can properly say. I owe a debt of thanks to the Librarians and 
Staff of the Chancellor Patterson Library especially the members of the Reference and 
Circulation departments. 
I would like to thank Fred McIntosh, the head of the Chancellor Patterson Library who 
over the years has provided me with funding for a number of research projects through the 
Vast and Magnificent Land fund. Some of those funds made it possible for me to travel to 
archives in Ottawa, Toronto, St. Paul and across Northwestern Ontario. 
I would to thank Wendy Pickard, the research assistant with the Treaty and Historical 
Research Centre of the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs. The Centre is a gold 
mine for researchers and Wendy is happy to offer a pick and shovel as well as some excellent 
advice to any who enter. 
Likewise, I would like to express my thanks to Victor Lytwyn and Gwyennth Jones of 
the Ontario Native Affairs Secretariat who have both shared their time (and their files) with 
me most generously. 
I would be remise if I did not acknowledge the help of the staff of the Lake of the 
Woods Museum in Kenora and the John B. Ridley Research Library at Quetico Park, 
especially Andrea Allison and Shirley Penuiak for all of their help. 
I would like to also thank Dr. Leonard Brulier, the director of the South Dakota Oral 
History Project at the University of South Dakota at Vermilion. Anyone interested in 
pursuing the study of the First Nations should talk to him. 
And finally, I would like to express my deepest thanks to Leo Waisberg, an 
ethnohistorian with the Treaty and Aboriginal Rights Research (TARR) of Grand Council 
Treaty #3. Just when I thought I had a command of the subject, I listened to Leo Waisberg 
for a couple of minutes and discovered I that I had a long way to go. Yet, that didn’t stop 
him for throwing me a much needed life line. 
I would especially like to thank my friend Paul Nadjiwan who taught me to see 
history in a different light. I would not have undertaken this thesis if it were not for him. 
And my parents, who have always been patient with me throughout the course of this 
project. 
I would especially like to thank an exceptional librarian in the Northern Studies 
Research Centre at Lakehead University. 
All of the good things in this paper belong to those people who I’ve met and worked 
with during the development of this thesis. The bad things, well, they are all mine. 
B.W. 
INTRODUCTION 
Treaty Three has been recognised by historians as a significant episode in the 
development of Canadian Indian policy since the agreement first attracted the attention of 
George Stanley in the 1930’s. Unlike many of the numbered treaties which were negotiated 
and signed relatively quickly, Treaty Three was four years in the making. The Saulteaux 
indicated their treaty terms to the government as early as 1869 and, despite numerous 
attempts by Canadian negotiators to influence them, they remained firm on their basic 
position until the arrival of Lieutenant-Governor Alexander Morris at the Lake of the Woods 
in the fall of 1873.^ Then, in a manner of weeks, the Saulteaux reached an agreement with 
Morris which, while superior to the ones signed earlier in Manitoba, fell far short of the 
demands they made on to the government in 1869. As a result, Morris has been given credit 
for an achievement that had eluded Canadian authorities since the Red River Resistance. This 
is not surprising since much of what we know about the day-to-day events during the 
negotiations that led to Treaty' Three comes from the report he filed with the Canadian 
government following the signing of the agreement and from his book, The Treaties of 
^Throughout this paper the Amerindians who signed Treaty Three will be referred to as 
the Saulteaux. This is the name by which the Canadians referred to them throughout the 
period with which this paper deals. These people, however, did not specifically identify 
themselves by this name. In fact, in a document that listed their treaty demands in 1869, 
these people referred to themselves simply as "the various bands of Indians in the vicinity of 
Fort Francis and the Lake of the Woods." Nevertheless, they are part of the Ojibwa- 
speaking people who occupy much of the Great Lakes Basin. There are, of course, 
Amerindians who signed later treaties on the Canadian prairies who are referred as Saulteaux 
as well as well as those people who originally occupied the region near Sault Ste. Marie. In 
Canada, they are often called Ojibwa, and in the United States, they are known as Chippewa. 
The people call themselves Anishinabe. 
Canada with the Indians.^ The tribal memories of the Amerindians of this region might 
reveal a somewhat different version of the Treaty Three negotiations. Even a careful reading 
of the available sources challenges the conventional wisdom concerning the role played by 
Morris during the talks that led to Treaty Three. Does he deserve to receive the lion’s share 
of the credit for negotiating this agreement? What of the role of Simon Dawson, the 
engineer who supervised the construction of the Red River Route or how significant was the 
part played by James McKay and other leaders of the Red River Metis community in the 
successful conclusion of Treaty Three? 
This thesis argues that, although, Morris gathered more information on the Saulteaux 
prior to the negotiations, he approached his dealings with the Amerindians of the region in 
much the same manner as Wemyss Simpson, the Indian Commissioner, who, for years, was 
unable to reach an agreement with the Saulteaux prior to the final meeting in the fall of 1873. 
It demonstrates this by examining the negotiating positions of both the Saulteaux and the 
Canadian government prior to the treaty in 1873. It then assesses the political environment 
in which Morris found himself as Lieutenant-Governor of Manitoba and the North-West 
Territories in 1873 and shows how it impacted on the negotiating instructions he received 
from the Canadian government. Finally, it examines why earlier attempts by the Canadian 
government to reach an agreement with the Saulteaux failed and concludes with the successful 
negotiations that Morris led in 1873. It becomes obvious that Treaty Three was not the 
^Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North- 
West Territories including Negotiations on which they Were Based. (Toronto, 1880); 
reprinted Toronto: Coles Publishing Company, 1971). 
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personal triumph of Alexander Morris, the man, rather the achievement of Lieutenant- 
Governor Morris, the Queen’s representative in Manitoba and the North-West Territories. 
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CHAPTER ONE: TREATY THREE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CANADIAN 
INDIAN POLICY. 
The first decade following Confederation is one of the most significant ten year 
periods in the development of Canadian Indian policy. Between 1867 and 1876, the federal 
government reorganised its Indian department no less than four times, made changes in its 
policy and passed its first Indian Act. The Indian Act of 1876 effectively made Amerindians 
wards of the State and attempted to destroy their culture through assimilationalist policies. It 
is not surprising that the Indian Act was developed when Canada was negotiating the 
numbered treaties which saw massive transfers of land title from the Amerindian peoples of 
the West to the federal government. In spite of these negotiations, the Indian Act did not 
conform to the spirit of the numbered treaties. The Canadian government had plans for the 
West which did not include fostering the traditional way of life of the First Nations. 
In less than a decade, almost all of the territory from Shebandowan from the Height 
of Land near Lake Superior to the Rockies was transferred from the Amerindians to the 
Canadian government. In 1871, Indian title was extinguished in the Red River District 
(Treaties One and Two), followed by the Lake of the Woods and Rainy River valley in 1873 
(Treaty Three). By the following summer, territory including what is now southern 
Saskatchewan was surrendered (Treaty Four), Treaty Five was signed in 1875 and, in 1876, 
the North Saskatchewan River District was ceded (Treaty Six). The immense transfer was 
completed in 1877 with the surrender of most of Alberta and the area south of the 
Saskatchewan River (Treaty Seven). Much can be learned about Canada’s future Indian 
policy from study of the process by which this land transfer took place as well as of the 
government’s cavalier attitude toward its treaty obligations once these agreements were 
signed.^ 
This is not to say that British North Americans lacked expertise in Indian affairs prior 
to Confederation. The Province of Canada had, in fact, exercised exclusive authority over 
Indian administration since 1860. Before this, affairs with Amerindians were managed by the 
British through military officials until 1830 when the responsibilities was transferred to 
civilian authorities.^ In both cases, officials answered directly to the Governor-General. The 
day-to-day administration, however, remained in the hands of Indian agents who acted as 
middlemen between the government and the First Nations. The principal goal of Indian 
policy prior to Confederation was to maintain the alliance with the Amerindians by providing 
presents and limited economic assistance.^ 
Even as settlers began to move westward, there was no significant change in Indian 
policy. Rather than making a complete overall of policy, the government adopted different 
approaches to the various First Nations in the distinct regions. Contact between the 
Amerindians had been a reality for centuries, however, the situation was more limited and 
sporadic. The new reality resulting from the agreement to transfer control of Rupert’s Land 
from the Hudson’s Bay Company to the Dominion government placed new demands on 
^Thomas Flanagan, "Aboriginal Claims in the Prairie Provinces" in Aboriginal Land 
Claims in Canada. A Regional Perspective, ed. Ken Coates (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman 
Ltd, 1992), 32. 
^Anthony J. (Tony) Hall, "The Red Man’s Burden: Land, Law and the Lord in Indian 
Affairs of Upper Canada, 1791-1858" (unpublished PhD dissertation. University of Toronto, 
1984), 3. 
^L.F.S. Upton, "Origins of Canadian Indian Policy" in the Journal of Canadian 
Studies 8, no. 4 (November 1973): 55. 
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Indian policy. The British, after all, had developed an Indian policy that was regional in 
nature. The Province of Canada continued this approach until Confederation.® John A. 
Macdonald understood the importance of adopting a national perspective in Indian affain 
when he ensured that the federal government would oversee Indian administration under 
Section 91(24) of the British North America Act. To meet this obligation, Macdonald 
reorganised his Indian department several times during Canada’s first decade. Initially, the 
Secretary of State for the Provinces and later the Superintendent-General of Indian Affairs 
were charged with the development of Indian policy. The Department of the Interior was 
established in 1873, however, and Boards of Indian Commissioners were created to ovenee 
Indian policy in Manitoba, the North-West Territories, and British Columbia. The first 
Board in Manitoba was composed of high ranking civil servants including Joseph-Alfred- 
Norbert Provencher, the regional Indian Superintendent, Alexander Morris, (1826-1889) 
newly appointed as Lieutenant-Governor of Manitoba and the North-West Territories, and the 
Scottish-bom civil engineer, Simon J. Dawson (1820-1902).’ Dawson was appointed at the 
last minute to replace Lindsay Russell, the provincial land agent, who refused to sit on the 
Board because he thought it constituted a conflict of mterest. The Board of Commissioners 
®George F. G. Stanley, "As Long as the Sun Shines and Water Flows: An Historical 
Comment" in As Long As The Sun Shines And Water Flows: A Reader in Canadian Native 
Studies, eds. Ian A.L. Getty and Antoine S. Lussier (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 1983), 10. 
’Simon Dawson is perhaps best known for his role in the surveying and construction 
of the Red River Route (also known as the Dawson Road). The "route", really a series of 
roads, portages and steam-ship lines, stretched across what is now Northwestern Ontario and 
Eastern Manitoba from Prince Arthur’s Landing to Fort Garry. For a complete account of his 
life, see M.E. Arthur, Simon Dawson C.E. (Thunder Bay: Thunder Bay Historical Museum 
Society, 1987). 
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was charged above all with the responsibility of extinguishing Indian title in Manitoba and 
assimilating Indians into mainstream white society.* 
The Manitoba Board of Indian Commissioners was uniquely qualified for the task at 
hand since, although all but Dawson lacked significant experience with Amerindians, they 
represented the highest-ranking public officials in Manitoba. The Provincher family, for 
instance had a long association with Amerindians in the West. Joseph-Norbert Provencher, 
the first Bishop of St. Boniface and uncle to the new Indian Superintendent, had tried to 
influence Metis social customs as well as to encourage them, unsuccessfully, to adopt 
agriculture.^ The bishop also provided support for his nephew to receive a formal education 
in Quebec. The young man studied law and began a career in journalism before, 
unsuccessfully, contesting a seat for the Conservative Party in Lower Canada during the 1867 
federal election. Nevertheless, he was rewarded for his attempt with a patronage appointment 
from Prime Minister Macdonald as the secretary to the newly appointed lieutenant-governor 
of the region in 1869. Unfortunately for him, he arrived at the height of the Red River 
Resistance and was arrested and subsequently jailed by Riel. Upon his release, Provencher 
returned to Canada via the United States. In 1871, he was appointed immigration 
commissioner to encourage the settlement of Manitoba and after a brief appointment in Paris 
^Robert G. Moore, John Leslie and Ron Maguire eds. The Historical Development 
of the Indian Act (Ottawa: Treaties and Historical Research Centre, Indian and Northern 
Affairs, 1978), 51. 
^A.S. Lussier, "Msgr. Provencher and the Native People of Red River, 1818-1853" 
Prairie Forum 10, no. 1; 13. 
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returned to Fort Gany as the Superintendent of Indian Affairs.^® 
Unlike Provencher and his misadventures, Simon Dawson developed an understanding 
of Amerindians as a result of his long experience west of Lake Superior. In particular, he 
understood the Saulteaux after spending years negotiating with them as a public servant 
working at various times for both the Canadian and Ontario governments. As for Lieutenant- 
Governor Morris, even though he lacked experience in Indian affairs, he brought the prestige 
of the Crown to the Board.“ He also shared John A. Macdonald’s vision of a Canada that 
rivalled the power and influence of the United States. He was also an individual blessed with 
good sense. Along with Oliver Mowat, the future premier of Ontario, Morris had articled 
under John A. Macdonald and served as a cabinet minister before his appointment in 
Manitoba. 
The first test of the new Board was the negotiation of Treaty Three with the Saulteaux 
along the Line of Route of the Dawson Road, an agreement that had eluded Canadian 
authorities since 1869 when the Saulteaux first indicated their treaty demands to the federal 
government. The Saulteaux, part of the Anishinabe First Nation, were part of the 
Algonquian-speaking people who occupied the territory that stretched from Shebandowan just 
^“Kenneth Landry, "Joseph-Alfred-Norbert Provencher" Dictionary of Canadian 
Biography (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), vol. 11, 716-7. 
"David T. McNab, "The Administration of Treaty 3: The Location of the 
Boundaries of Treaty 3 Indian Reserves in Ontario, 1873-1915" in As Long As The Sun 
Shines, eds. Getty and Lussier, 147. 
"Jean Friesen, "Alexander Morris" Dictionary of Canadian Biography (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1982), vol. 11, 608-15. 
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east of the Lakehead to the North-West Angle. They arrived in the region relatively late, 
migrating westward along the north and south shores of Lake Superior during the and 18* 
centuries, with some arriving to Manitoba as late as 1850.^^ They followed an annual cycle that 
involved hunting, fishing, and gathering. They adopted agriculture around the Lake of the Woods 
and Rainy River regions at the beginning of the nineteenth century and this resulted in a dramatic 
increase in their population. The fiir trade, not surprising, played a significant role in the 
economy of this woodland people. 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, the arrival of Euro-Canadian interests in the region on a 
large scale, particularly during the building of the Dawson Road, demonstrated the need to 
negotiate a treaty with the Canadian government that would protect their culture and way of life, 
on the one hand, and assist in their social and economic transition, on the other. Nevertheless, 
the demands of the Saulteaux had changed very little from 1869, when the Canadian government 
first formally approached them regarding a treaty, until 1873, when the agreement was finally 
^^Rodger W. and Priscilla K. Buffalohead, Against the Tide of American History: The 
Story of the Mille Lacs Anisinabe. (Cass Lake, Minnesota: The Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 
1985), 5-7. 
^■^Leo. G. Waisberg and Tim E. Holzkam, “‘A Tendency to Discourage Them From 
Cultivating’ ; Ojibwa Agriculture and Indians Affairs Administration in Northwestern Ontario” in 
Enthnohistory 40, no. 2 (1993). 
^^Sarah Carter, Lost Harvests, Prairie Indian Reserve Farmers and Government Policy 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993), 55. 
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signed. 
For its part, the Canadian government had struggled over its Indian policy since 
Confederation. It waffled between negotiating ad hoc agreements with the Amerindians of 
Western Canada as issues arose and establishing a formal relationship with them through 
comprehensive treaties. The Canadian government’s decision to initiate treaty talks was 
influenced by a number of events in the West. It perceived an American threat to the former 
Hudson’s Bay Company territory, which passed into Canadian control in 1870.^^ In spite of 
initial agreements with the Manitoba Cree and Chippewa, in Treaties One and Two 
respectively, the Canadian government could not convince the Saulteaux to accept its terms 
for a treaty until the arrival of Morris in 1873. He was, in fact, Canada’s chief negotiator 
not only in Treaty Three but also in the subsequent Treaties Four, Five and Six. There is 
little doubt that the lessons he learned during the Treaty Three talks were applied later to 
Amerindian peoples across Western Canada. The part played by Morris is, important, 
therefore, in understanding the place of the numbered treaties in the evolution of Canadian 
Indian policy in the 1870’s. 
Treaty Three is significant for a number of other reasons as well. Assuming that the 
timetable set by the Canadian government had been adhered to. Treaty Three would have 
been Treaty One; however, the Saulteaux along the Line of Route were not prepared to cede 
^‘^Morris, Treaties of Canada. 44-46. 
'^Donald Creigton, John A. Macdonald, the Old Chieftain (Toronto: The Macmillan 
Company of Canada Limited, 1955), 45-46. 
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title to their territory.^* Unlike the Cree and Chippewa, who were forced to sign Treaties 
One and Two relatively quickly, the Saulteaux resisted federal negotiators for four years 
before finally agreeing to sign Treaty Three in 1873. Why did the Canadian government take 
so long to reach an agreement with the Saulteaux compared with the First Nations of Western 
Canada? This question can best be addressed by re-examining the political and economic 
context in which this treaty was achieved. Treeaty Three, in fact, provides some of the best 
best available evidence that the Amerindians understood their political relationship with 
Canada as government to government.^’ 
For the Saulteaux, Treaty Three was important for other reasons. This was the first 
time they entered negotiations knowing the true intentions of the Canadian government and 
took appropriate precautions to protect their interests. Chief Powasson, one of the Saulteaux 
^*Throughout this paper, Saulteaux will refer to the Algonquian-speaking people who 
occupied the territory in Northwestern Ontario that was transferred as a result of the signing 
of Treaty Three in 1873. There are, of course, Amerindians who signed later treaties on the 
prairies who also refer to themselves as Saulteaux as well as those people who reside at Sault 
St. Marie. Nevertheless, the people who negotiated Treaty Three with the Canadian 
government were continually referred to as the Saulteaux by all of the principal Canadian 
negotiators throughout the decades leading up to and following the signing of Treaty Three. 
The "Saulteaux" are also known as Chippewa and Ojibwa. The people call themselves 
Anishinabe or "the people". 
‘’Olive P. Dickason and L. C. Green, Laws of Nations and the New World. (Edmonton: 
University of Alberta Press, 1989). This important book discusses the case of Amerindian 
rights in Canada by examining whether the First Nations formed governments as defined by 
Western legal tradition at the time of contact. Green asserts that they did not, however, 
Dickason, on the other hand, argues that the Amerindians did form such governments and 
thus satisfied the terms of international law. She says that to argue otherwise is to ignore 
hundreds of years of negotiated treaties between the British, the American and the Canadian 
authorities and the Amerindians. The British, in particular, she argues, imderstood that the 
Amerindians enjoyed title to their land and negotiated treaties with them in order to 
extinguish it. Both the American and Canadian governments chose to follow this tradition. 
11 
who signed Treaty Three, asked Joseph Nolin, a member of a prominent family of the Red 
River Metis from Point du Chene, to prepare a transcript of the negotiations with the 
Canadians in case of future misunderstanding. The Saulteaux were well aware of disputes 
arising out of Treaties One and Two and the problems their relatives across the border 
experienced after they signed treaties with the American government.^ 
Like the other Amerindians of the West, the Saulteaux were skilled negotiators as a 
result of their long trading relationship with French traders from Montreal, the North West 
Company and the Hudson’s Bay Company. Arthur Ray argues that Aboriginal fur traders 
were seldom cheated by the Hudson’s Bay Company. On the contrary, they forced the HBC 
to improve trade goods in order to maintain access to furs.^^ While the economic situation 
of many Amerindian fur traders changed drastically after the "amalgamation" of the 
Northwest Company with the Hudson’s Bay Company in 1821, there is ample evidence that 
the Saulteaux traded successfully with independent traders and with represenatives of 
American fur companies throughout the nineteenth century. The Hudson’s Bay Company, 
ironically, aided Saulteaux self-sufficiency by closing posts (in order to reduce costs) and by 
concentrating its efforts west of the North West Angle.^ As a result, the Saulteaux enjoyed 
“Donald A. Grinde and Quintard Taylor, "Red VS Black: Conflict and Accommodation 
in the Post Civil War Indian Territory, 1865-1907" American Indian Quarterly 8, no. 3 
(Summer 1984): 212. 
^^Arthur Ray, "Indians as Consumers in the Eighteenth Century" in Old Trails and 
New Directions: Papers of the Third North American Fur Trade Conference eds. Carol M. 
Judd and Arthur J. Ray (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 267. 
“Victor Lytwyn, The Fur Trade of the Little North, Indians, Pedlars^ and Englishmen 
East of Lake Winnipeg. 1760-1821. (Winnipeg: Rupert’s Land Research Centre, University 
of Winnipeg, 1986), 161-62. 
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a degree of indepence from the Hudson’s Bay Company that was due in no small to their 
accessto other traders, their relative isolation and the richness of the country they occupied.^ 
Despite the acquisition of Rupert’s Land, the Canadian government considered the 
former Hudson’s Bay empire as Indian territory and recognised that the need to extinguish 
Amerindian title to the land.^ The Red River Resistance, the negotiations with Louis Riel’s 
Provisional Government, and the subsequent admission of Manitoba into Confederation 
forced the Canadian government to negotiate treaties with the Aboriginal peoples of the 
West.^ The desire to maintain sovereignty from coast to coast forced the Canadian 
government to develop a economic strategy aimed at linking the country by means of a 
transcontinental railroad, the rapid settlement of the prairie, and the industrialization of the 
East. The admission of British Columbia into Confederation in 1871 placed railroad 
construction at the top of the federal agenda since the terms by which the province agreed to 
join the Dominion included the construction of a transcontinental railway joining it to the rest 
of Canada. 
^Simon J. Dawson, "General Report On The Progress Of The Red River Expedition," in 
Report On The Exploration Of The Country Between Lake Superior And The Red River 
Settlement. And Between the Latter Place And The Assiniboine And Saskatchewan. (Toronto, 
1859), 14-15. As found in part at the John B. Ridley Research Library, Quetico Provincial 
Park. 
^Frank J. Tough, "Aboriginal Rights Versus the Deed of Surrender: The Legal 
Rights of Native Peoples and Canada’s Acquisition of the Hudson’s Bay Company Territory," 
Prairie Forum 17, no. 2 (Fall 1992): 239. 
“George F.G. Stanley, "As Long as the Sun Shines and Water Flows: An Historical 
Comment" in As Long As The Sun Shines eds. Getty and Lussier, 10. 
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The transfer of land title from the First Nations who occupied Western Canada thus 
became the linchpin of John A. Macdonald’s national ambition.^ The signing of treaties 
was necessary to maintain peace and order and encourage the arrival of settlers who would 
help to establish Canada’s sovereignty in the territory. The Canadian government had a 
problem. It wanted to avoid anything resembling the costly Indian wars plaguing the United 
States following the end of the Civil War. These ongoing conflicts cost American taxpayers 
$20 million a year during the 1870’s.^ The Canadian government also hoped to escape the 
financial burden of compensating the Amerindians properly for their land through 
comprehensive treaty agreements.^ Nevertheless, when faced with an energetic rival to the 
South, the demands of British Columbia and continuing Aboriginal unrest in Manitoba, the 
Canadian government was forced to adopt a more flexible negotiating position with the First 
Nations in the 1870’s.” 
The issue of land title in territory occupied by the Saulteaux presented a serious 
obstacle to the economic and political objectives of the Canadian government. Before East 
and West could be joined by a transcontinental railroad, the federal government would have 
“McNab, "Administration of Treaty 3", As Long As The Sunshines eds. Getty and 
Lussier, 146. 
^Gerald A. Friesen, "Preparing Western Settlement, 1870-1890" Journal of the 
West 23 no. 4: 6. 
^Ibid. 
^John Leonard Taylor, "Canada’s Northwest Indian Policy in the 1870’s: 
Traditional Premises and Necessary Innovations" in The Spirit of the Alberta Indian Treaties, 
ed. Richard Price (Toronto: Butterworth and Company, 1979): 7. 
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to achieve an agreement and extinguish the land title of the Saulteaux. This region was 
critical because, without it, an all-Canadian route, linking the East and the West, was 
impossible.^® Even though there was access through the area via the Dawson Road, Simon 
Dawson and others familiar with the Saulteaux had grave doubts as to whether these people 
were prepared to allow any more transportation construction through their territory without a 
formal treaty. As it was, the Canadian government had reluctantly agreed to pay the 
Saulteaux in order to obtain permission to survey and construct the Dawson Road.^‘ 
For their part, the Saulteaux believed that a treaty with Canada would protect their 
interests in the region by outlining the terms and conditions of any future development. In 
exchange for annuities, protection of their traditional way of life and assistance in making the 
transition to "modem" ways, the Saulteaux were prepared to grant safe passage through their 
lands to settlers on their way to the West. According to official government reports, some of 
them prepared by Dawson, these people believed in their sovereignty over the territory which 
they occupied. He reported that the Saulteaux had stated as early as the 1850’s, that 
encroachment on their lands threatened their traditional way of life.^^ More recently, the 
Saulteaux had indicated to Dawson that they were prepared to defend their territorial rights 
aggressively against the arrival of agricultural settlers, mining prospectors, and entrepreneurs 
^McNab, "Administration", As Long as the Sunshines Getty and Lussier, 146. 
^‘Provincial Archives of Manitoba, Adams Archibald Papers, Lieutenant-Governor’s 
Collection, 25. 
^^Irene M. Spry, "The Tragedy of the Loss of the Commons in Western Canada" in 
As Long As The Sun Shines Getty and Lussier, 211. 
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entering their territory.These reports also indicated that, although the Saulteaux were 
prepared to allow safe passage by white travellers along the Dawson Road to destinations 
west of the Lake of the Woods region without a treaty, they were unwilling to guarantee the 
same protection to passengers on the proposed railroad through their territory without a 
formal agreement.^ Although it was unlikely that the Saulteaux could prevent the 
construction of the Pacific railroad through their territory, the government recognised that 
action needed to be taken to avoid any type of conflict in the region that would threaten 
setders eager to settle the West.^^ Any such problems, real or imagined, would have both 
inhibited settlers from emigrating to the West through the region and slowed the construction 
of the Pacific railroad between Shabandawon and the North-West Angle. 
It is not surprising that Treaty Three has attracted the attention of Canadian historians 
interested in relations between Amerindians andd Eurocanadians. No comprehensive study of 
Treaty Three has yet been undertaken, however, many articles have been written on the 
importance of this agreement. Lieutenant-Governor Alexander Morris, who led the Canadian 
delegation that negotiated Treaty Three with the Saulteaux in 1873, published The Treaties of 
Canada with the Indians, as an account of his treaty-making experiences in the Canadian 
"John B. Ridley Research Library, Quetico Provincial Park Archives, Dawson 
Collection, (Cited hereafter as the Dawson collection) Simon Dawson to the Honourable J.C. 
Aikens, Ottawa, September 12, 1871. 
^Ibid. 
"Bruce W. Muirhead in "Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Ontario Boundary Dispute 
and Treaty Three, 1873-1915" unpublished article. 
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West.^^ This book forms the foundation upon which much of our knowledge of the 
numbered treaties is built. In addition to this, Morris filed a detailed report with his 
superiors in Ottawa. It contained not only the notes taken by his shorthand reporter and a 
newspaper article on the negotiations but also copies of both Dawson’s report and the 
Paypom Treaty (otherwise known as the Nolin notes).^ 
In the 1930’s, George F.G. Stanley was the first professional historian to recognize 
the significance of Treaty Three. In The Birth of Western Canada: A History of the Riel 
Rebellions. Stanley relied mostly on the published and unpublished accounts of Morris and 
presented Treaty Three as an important chapter in the opening of the Canadian West for 
white settlement. He applied Turner’s Frontier Thesis to the Canadian West to explain its 
development as primarily a clash "between primitive and civilized peoples".^* Unlike the 
United States, he argued Canada was able to avoid armed conflicts between the Amerindians 
and the settlers from the East by adopting the conciliatory stance in race relations that had 
proved so successful for the Hudson’s Bay Company. The relationship, he maintained, was 
continued after 1870 by the Canadian government through the treaty-making process. This 
operation was greatly aided by the fact that Canada was more successful than the United 
States in maintaining law and order on its frontier. The Canadian effort was made possible, 
^Alexander Morris, Treaties of Canadawith the Indains of Manitoba and the North-West 
Territories including Negotiations on which they Were Based (Toronto, 1880); reprinted 
Toronto: Coles Publishing Company, 1971. 
^^National Archives of Canada, RG 10 Department of Indian Affairs Red Series Volume 
1918 File 2790A. (Cited hereafter as NAC). 
^*George F.G. Stanley, The Birth of Western Canada: A History of the Riel Rebellions 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), vii. 
17 
he wrote, by the overall cooperation of the Metis.Unfortunately, Treaty Three involves 
only a portion of a chapter in The Birth of the West in which the main focus is Riel and the 
Metis resistance.^ Nevertheless, he recognised that the Saulteaux were able to force the 
Canadian government to grant concessions that it did not have to concede to other 
Amerindians in earlier treaties. In addition, he acknowledged that the Saulteaux understood 
the value of their territory in terms of mineral wealth and points out that the Canadian 
government realized that their territory was vital for the future construction of the Pacific 
railroad."^^ In spite of his sympathy for Amerindians and his pioneering work to give them a 
proper place in Canadian history, Stanley shared the commonly held view of his day that 
Aboriginal peoples were ’’primitive" and "savageWhile he never asserts that the 
Canadian government deliberately misled the Saulteaux or any of the other signatories of the 
numbered treaties, he does conclude the Canadians were unable to clearly explain the true 
significance of these documents to the Amerindians and suggests this as the major reason 
there was so many dissatisfaction 
After Stanley, there was little serious interest in Treaty Three, the numbered treaties 
or even Canadian Indian policy until the 1970’s when academics took a renewed interest in 







of study as Native History would provide more satisfying answers to historical problems, 
particularly in Western Canada, than was possible with more traditional approaches. Native 
History became the focus of many doctoral students interested in such an understanding of 
Canadian histoiy. Two Ph.D dissertations that concentrated on the development of Canadian 
Indian Policy signalled the beginning of a re-examination of the acquisition of the West and 
its impact on Aboriginal peoples. J. Douglas Leighton’s "The Development of Federal 
Indian Policy in Canada, 1840-1890" focused on the transition from imperial control of 
Indian affairs in British North American to Dominion authorities and the subsequent creation 
of its own bureaucracy.John L. Taylor’s "The Development of an Indian Policy for the 
Canadian North-West, 1864-79" examined the federal government’s resolve to oversee the 
safe settlement of the Canadian West and the pacification of the Amerindians through the 
treaty-making process.'*^ 
In the 1980’s, a greater understanding of Treaty Three was possible as numerous 
studies of Canadian Indian policy and the numbered treaties challenged the conventional 
wisdom on Amerindians. One of the best articles to date on Treaty Three is Jean Friesen’s 
"My Birthright and My Land: The Making of Treaty Three".In it, she rejects the notion 
that the Amerindians were helpless victims of history and contends that the Saulteaux, 
experienced negotiators as a result of the fur trade, understood the gravity of their situation 
'^J.D. Leighton, "The Development of Federal Indian Policy in Canada, 1840-1890." 
Ph.D thesis. University of Western Ontario, 1975. 
^*John L. Taylor’s "The Development of an Indian Policy for the Canadian North-West, 
1864-79" Ph.D thesis. Queen’s University, 1975. 
^Jean Friesen, "My Birthright And My Land: The Making of Treaty Three" Native 
Studies Conference Proceeding, n.p., Brandon University, November 1981. 
19 
and negotiated the best agreement they could under the circumstances. She argues that the 
Saulteaux saw Treaty Three as a political agreement by which they traded the title of their 
territory to the Canadian government for future economic security."^’ 
Not surprisingly. Treaty Three has attracted the attention of other historians interested 
in Amerindians and the settlement of Western Canada. Treaty Three was negotiated at a time 
when the federal government was developing the Indian Act of 1876. The debate over the 
evolution of Canadian Indian policy during the 1870’s has created two camps. The first is 
led by historians such as David McNab, Jean Friesen and Anthony Hall who argue that 
Ottawa adopted the British model and adapted it to the needs of the Canadian West. The 
second is led by Douglas Leigton and John Taylor who had suggested that the government 
attempted to create a new national Indian policy in response to the new realities facing the 
country after Confederation. An understanding of this debate is critical for a clear perception 
of Treaty Three in particular and the numbered treaties in general because it sheds different 
light on the motives of the Canadian government regarding Indian policy during the 1870’s. 
Hall, for instance, rejects the notion that the 1870’s involved any break with traditional 
British Indian Policy. Instead, he argues that British policy in the West was modified by a 
peculiar mix of religious zeal and business oportunism. Christian churches, particularly the 
Methodists, wanted to share the Gospel with the Amerindians of the West and saw the 
Hudson’s Bay Company as an obstacle to their desire to spread the Word of God. On the 
other hand, business interests, especially those in Toronto, favoured the annexation of the 
^’Jean Friesen, "Magnificent Gifts: The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of the 
Northwest 1869-76" Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada Series V, Volume 1, 1986, 
43. 
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West in order to profit from the agricultural settlement of the West. The Hudson’s Bay 
Company stood in the way of such development as a threat to its own interest in the region. 
This unusal mixture of interests combined to form the foundation of an Indian policy that 
suited the Canadian experience, according to Hall.'^ 
For many scholars. Treaty Three marks a watershed for it represents the first time in 
the negotiation of the numbered treaties that Amerindians were able to force the Canadian 
government to address their demands seriously. Nevertheless, this position, accepted by 
virtually all those specializing in Native History, is now being seriously challenged. David J. 
Hall contends that all of the concessions won by the Saulteaux during the Treaty Three 
negotiations, particularly those regarding agricultural assistance, had not only been discussed 
during the Treaty One talks but also were actually accepted by the Canadian government.'® 
Another series of articles looks at the impact of Treaty Three on the Saulteaux in 
respect to the interests of Ontario. These articles focus on the years between 1873, the 
signing of Treaty Three, and 1915, when the Ontario government finally agreed to "confirm" 
Indian reserves in Northwestern Ontario. Bruce W. Muirhead, in "Between Scylla and 
Chaiybdis: The Ontario Boundary Dispute and Treaty Three, 1873-1915," argues that neither 
the Canadian nor the Ontario government acted in the best interests of the Saulteaux during 
the Ontario Boundary dispute.^ Similarly, David T. McNab argues in "The Administration 
^Anthony (Tony) Hall, "Closing an Incomplete Circle" Canadian Journal of Native 
Studies 6, no. 2 (1986): 197-221 and "The Red Man’s Burden: Land, Law and the Lord in 
the Indian Affairs of Upper Canada, 1791-1858" Ph.D thesis. University of Toronto, 1985. 
^D.J. Hall, "A Serene Atmosphere:? Treaty 1 Revisited" Canadian Journal of Natives 
Studies 4, no. 2 (1984) 321-358. 
Muirhead, "Between Scylla and Charybdis", 1. 
21 
of Treaty Three: The Location of the Boundaries Of Treaty Three Indian Reserves in Ontario, 
1873-1915” that Amerindian rights were lost in the struggle of Ontario to expand its borders 
to the North-West Angle.^^ He focuses more specifically on the impact of this federal- 
provincial dispute on the Saulteaux in "‘Principally Rocks and Burnt Lands’: Crown Reserves 
and the Tragedy of the Sturgeon Lake First Nation in Northwestern Ontario". 
In addition to documenting the consequences of Treaty Three in terms of federal - 
provincial relations, McNab challenges the role of the Metis allegedly played in the 1873 
negotiations. Morris wrote in The Treaties of Canada with the Indians the Metis were 
instrumental in the negotiations that led to Treaty Three. In his report on the successful 
negotiations, he pointed out the importance of the Metis in helping him reach an agreement: 
[I have] much pleasure in bearing testimony to the hearty cooperation and 
efficient aid the Commissioners received from the Metis who were present at 
the Angle, and who, with one accord, whether French or English origin, used 
the influence which their relationship to the Indians gave them, to impress 
them with the necessity of their entering into the Treaty. 
At least one of the Saulteaux representatives at the Treaty Three negotiations formally 
recognised the important role played by the Metis during the successful negotiations. Chief 
Mawedopeness of Rainy River, the principal Saulteaux spokesperson told Morris at the close 
^^David T. McNab, "Administration of Treaty Three" in As Long as the Sun Shines eds. 
Getty and Lussier, 145-58. 
^^David T. McNab, "‘Principally Rocks and Burnt Land’: Crown Reserves and the 
Tragedy of the Sturgeon Lake First Nation in Northwestern Ontario in Aboriginal Resource 
Use in Canada: Historical and Legal Aspects eds. Kerry Abel and Jean Friesen. (Winnipeg: 
University of Manitoba Press, 1991), 157-172. 
^^NAC, RGIO, volume 1918, file 2790B. 
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of negotiations, "I wish you to understand you owe the treaty much to the Halfbreeds. 
The role of the Metis during the Treaty Three negotiations has consequently been the 
focus of some debate. McNab appears to be the exception in historical circles with respect to 
this. He does not take Morris at his word and argues that the Metis had little influence on 
the Saulteaux and played no leadership role at all. He says that they were merely "reporters, 
interpreters and witnesses. Wendy Moss, however, makes a strong case for the important 
role of the Metis using sources other than Morris. In "Metis Adhesion to Treaty Three," she 
asserted that the Canadian government recognised the Metis as a distinct group only when 
their influence was sufficiently strong enough to influence other Aboriginal peoples. She 
concluded that the Metis adhesion to Treaty Three, the only treaty in Canada that recognised 
the equal status of Metis with other Aboriginal peoples, proves that the Metis were influential 
in securing the signatures of the Saulteaux in 1873.^ Olive Dickason also argues that the 
Metis played a crucial role in assisting the Canadian government negotiate Treaty Three with 
the Saulteaux. However, she goes further in arguing that their help was not limited to simply 
this treaty but were involved in all the numbered treaties.^’ 
The vast majority of the articles written about Treaty Three deal with land claims and 
the control of resources. Angela Emmerson, a former researcher for the Ontario Ministry of 
^Ibid. 
^^David T. McNab, "Hearty’ Co-operation and Efficient Aid, The Metis and Treaty #3" 
Canadian Journal of Native Studies 3 no.l (1983): 131-49. 
^Wendy L. Moss, "Metis Adhesion To Treaty No. 3" March 16, 1979. As found at the 
Treaty and Historical Research Centre, Department of Indian Affairs, Ottawa, Canada. 
’^Olive P. Dickason, Canada's First Nations: A History of Founding Peoples from 
Earliest Times (Toronto: McCelland and Stewart Inc., 1992), 279-80. 
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Natural Resources prepared a comprehensive study on the "headland to headland" question. 
In it, she supported the arguement that Ontario chipped away at the treaty rights of the 
Saulteaux until their value was lost.^* Grand Council Treaty Three, not surprisingly, has led 
the way in research on Aboriginal rights within the context of Treaty Three. Tim E. 
Holzkamm, Victor P. Lytwyn and Leo G. Waisberg outline in "Rainy River Sturgeon: An 
Ojibway Resource in the Fur Trade Economy" the value of the fishery to the Saulteaux and 
its destruction by white commercial fishermen.^’ In addition, Holzkamm and Waisberg have 
challenged the long established myth that agriculture was not important in Saulteaux 
subsistence before its "introduction" by Canadian authorities.®^ 
Much has been written on the development of Canadian Indian policy during the 
1870’s, the negotiations of Treaty Three and the role the Ontario government played in 
infringing upon the treaty rights of the Saulteaux. Considerable attention, too, has been paid 
to land claims and control of natural resources in terms of what was negotiated during the 
treaty talks in 1873. Nevertheless, there has been little study of the role of the events 
unfolding in Manitoba as Alexander Morris prepared to leave for the Northwest Angle and 
begin his face-to-face talks with the Saulteaux at Lake of the Woods. Morris was forced to 
’*Angela Emerson, "Research Report on Policy of the Government of Ontario Re 
Headland to Headland Question, Treaty No. 3, 1873-1878" Office of Indian Resource Policy, 
Ministry of Natural Resources (Ontario), 1978. 
^n’im E. Holzkamm, Victor P. Lytwyn and Leo G. Waisberg, "Rainy River Sturgeon: 
An Ojibway Resource in the Fur Trade Economy" 119-40 in Aboriginal Resource Use In 
Canada eds. Kerry Abel and Jean Friesen, (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1991), 
120. 
“Tim E.Holtzkamm and Leo G. Waisberg, "Agriculture and One 19th Century Ojibwa 
Band: "They Hardly Ever Loose Sight of Their Field," Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth 
Algonquian Conference (Montreal, Quebec: n.p., 1993). 
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reach an agreement with the Saulteaux in spite of strict instructions from the Dominion 
government regarding limited annuities and other provisions, on the one hand, and the firm 
conviction of their own rights by the Amerindians, on the other. He had to achieve an 
agreement within a political atmosphere in Manitoba that bordered on crisis. This thesis 
argues that although the negotiating position of the Saulteaux had been well known since 
1869, it was not until 1873 that Canadian negotiators, specifically Alexander Morris, had the 
authority in the eyes of the Saulteaux to carry on govemment-to-govemment talks with them 
annd address their demands. This made it possible for him to succeed where others had 
failed. 
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CHAPTER TWO: SOURCES OF THE SAULTEAUX NEGOTIATING POSITION 
While the determination of the federal negotiating position during the Treaty Three 
talks is a fairly simple exercise, the same cannot be said for the Saulteaux, Historians, 
traditionally, have relied very heavily on what Morris wrote regarding the numbered treaties. 
He was clearly more concerned about the material demands of the Saulteaux than any of the 
other issues facing these people in the 1870’s. He wrote that the Saulteaux wanted such 
things as generous annuities from the federal government, the provision of clothing 
corresponding to their rank in society, and weapons and ammunition provided on a regular 
basis.They also demanded domesticated animals and agricultural tools, including horses, 
buggies and new harnesses every four years, to assist them in their farming pursuits. Fishing 
twine and cord to make fishing nets were also part of their demands as were carpentry tools 
and cooking stoves. The Saulteaux, he wrote, required stores of food, including flour, pork, 
tea, sugar, and wheat, and supplies of garden seeds. Furthermore, Morris wrote these 
"demands should last, if granted, forever, that is to say during all time that an Indian will be 
alive in this part of the country.He estimated that their demands, including 
“Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians (Toronto, reprint of 
1880 ed.: Toronto: Coles, 1991). Morris published his thoughts on the treaty within a decade 
of the signing of the treaty. In addition, his papers, along with those of Archibald, exist at 
the Manitoba Archives in Winnipeg. 
“National Archives of Canada. Indian Affairs Red Series. (RG 10, Volume 1918, 
File 2790B) Demands Made By the Indians as their Terms for Treaty. October 2, 1873. 
Morris reported that the Saulteaux wanted $50 in annuities for each chief, $20 for each 
member of council, $15 for every "first" and "second" soldier. While every man. woman and 
child would receive $15 as an annuity the first year, followed by $10 in each subsequent 
year. The American government had made similar promises to the Sioux in treaty talks 
immediately before the Treaty Three negotiations. 
transportation, would cost $123,112 annually. 
Why did Morris make no reference to the Saulteaux demands for protection of their 
wild rice harvest or their fishing rights in the region? Why did he not refer to any of their 
demands for cultural protection? Fortunately, the Lieutenant-Governor had hired a shorthand 
reporter to provide a record of the Treaty Three negotiations. His report is significantly 
different from what Morris indicated he agreed to and what finally appeared in the text of 
Treaty Three as published by the Canadian government. These notes provide insight into the 
treaty demands of the Saulteaux and no doubt formed the basis for a newspaper account of 
the treaty negotiations which subsequently appeared in the Manitoban newspaper. In addition 
to the reporter’s notes, certain government documents provide information concerning the 
Saulteaux negotiating position. In order to prepare himself for the treaty negotiations, Morris 
had sent agents into the Saulteaux territory to ascertain their. The correspondence of his 
agents provides valuable insight into the Saulteaux position. Most of what Morris knew of 
the Saulteaux demands came, in fact, from these agents. As a result, Morris was much better 
prepared to negotiate with the Saulteaux than Adams Archibald, his predecessor as 
Lieutenant-Governor of Manitoba, had been. Morris’ agents gathered information and 
reported regularly to him before the actual discussions began. The writings of these agents 
shed a good deal of light on the Saulteaux position.® 
Of all the agents, Simon Dawson left the most complete set of papers regarding the 
Saulteaux prior to the Treaty Three talks in 1873. His surviving correspondence contains 
®Much of this correspondence is found in the Morris Papers at the Manitoba 
Archives as well as in the RG-10 Series at the National Archives of Canada. 
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documents ranging from early reports on his surveying expeditions through the Saulteaux 
territory in the 1850’s to his own notes on the Treaty Three negotiations. Later, as a 
Member of Parliament, Dawson made speeches in the House of Commons regarding Treaty 
Three. Dawson was recognised by such Amerindian leaders as Chief Blackstone and such 
government officials as Alexander Campbell, the Superintendent-General of Indian Affairs in 
1873, to be sympathetic to the Saulteaux and their future in the region. His ideas on how to 
deal with the Saulteaux had evolved dramatically during his years in their territory. 
Dawson’s first contact with the Saulteaux occurred when he was commissioned to survey the 
territory for the Province of Canada in the middle of the nineteenth century. In 1856, when 
he first met the Saulteaux, he advocated seeking only a right of way through their territories 
that would guarantee the safe construction of the Red River Route. He recognised that he 
needed their cooperation to find the most efficient way around the many swamps and bogs of 
the region. Until 1868, Dawson put forward many proposals for the negotiation of limited 
agreements with the Saulteaux in order to guarantee the safe construction of the Red River 
Route. By 1870, however, his opinion on the subject had changed. In a Report on the 
Indians, he now called on the government to negotiate a comprehensive treaty with the 
Saulteaux that would facilitate a massive transfer of land from the Amerindians to the 
Government of Canada. 
In spite of his empathy, Dawson’s papers must be used carefully regarding the 
Saulteaux negotiating position. Attention must be paid to the time period when he was 
writing any given report. His motives were different in 1856, when he was working for the 
Province of Canada, than they were when he was working for Alexander Morris in the 
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1870’s. His purpose was different yet again when he was speaking as a Member of 
Parliament for the region in the 1880’s. Nevertheless, it is from Dawson that we learn that 
the Saulteaux were prepared to make an armed resistance against any Pacific railroad built 
across their territory unless a treaty was first negotiated. He genuinely feared for the lives of 
farmers, loggers, and prospectors who might want to setde in the region, if a formal 
relationship were not established with the Saulteaux. Yet, at the same time, Dawson 
recognised that negotiation of a treaty with the Saulteaux presented an opportunity, for such 
an agreement would thwart growing American influence in their territory. As early as 1871, 
U.S. mining interests were surveying potential mine sites near the Dawson Road.^ Other 
American business interests were moving north to exploit the rich natural resources of the 
region. Dawson was concerned that, unless action were taken, profits from these ventures 
would disappear south of the international border.® 
Dawson’s correspondence also reveals an interest in the renewal of treaties between 
the United States government and the Chippewa, relatives of the Saulteaux who lived in 
Minnesota.® Major treaties between the United States and various Chippewa nations had 
®John B. Ridley Research Library, Quetico Provincial Park Archives, Dawson 
Collection, Simon Dawson to the Honourable J.C. Aikens, Secretary of State for Canada, 
September 12, 1871. (Cited hereafter as Dawson Collection). 
“Dawson Collection. Simon J. Dawson to the Honourable J.C. Aitkins, September 
12, 1871. See also Alexander Campbell Papers, Ontario Archives, Dawson to Campbell, 
September 12, 1871, as cited Elizabeth Arthur, Simon Dawson C.E. (Thunder Bay: Thunder 
Bay Historical Museum Society, 1987), 18. 
“The international border imposed on the Ojibwa by whites has done little to impede 
contact between family members living in either country. The respective Indian policies of 
Canada and the United States, particularly in the field of education, have had an impact on 
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been negotiated in 1826, 1836, 1842, 1854, and 1863. These agreements appeared to have a 
positive impact on both parties. Americans, for instance, were busy logging the forests, 
mining copper, and building transportation systems in Minnesota as a result of the La Pointe 
Treaty of 1854.®^ The Chippewa, for their part, found seasonal employment in these 
operations much of the year but returned to winter on their reservations where game was still 
plentiful. When they experienced bad weather and scarce game during the winter of 1869, 
how'ever, these employment opportunities helped to limit their suffering.®® 
In spite of the positive benefits of contact, however, Dawson reported to Ottawa that 
"his" Saulteaux realized, from the experience of their cousins in Minnesota, that even small 
numbers of whites, particularly farmers, constituted a serious threat to their way of life.® 
He warned Ottawa that these people were well armed and prepared to protect their interests in 
the Ojibwa language. More people in Northwestern Ontario, for example, continue to speak 
Ojibwa as their first language than in Minnesota. However, a growing number of 
Anishinawbe are learning Ojibwa as a second language on both sides of the international 
border. 
®For a more complete discussion of this issue see chapters 4 and 7 of Alvin C. 
Gluek, Miimesota and the Manifest Destiny of the Canadian Northwest: A Study in 
Canadian-American Relations (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965). 
“Edmund Jefferson Danziger, The Chippewas of Lake Superior (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1978), 94. 
®Leo G. Waisberg and Tim E. Holzkamm, "Agriculture and One 19th Century 
Ojibwa Band: "They Hardly Ever Loose Sight of Their Field" Proceeding of the Twenty- 
Fourth Algonquian Conference (Montreal, Que.: n.p., 1993). 
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the region.Dawson was concerned that, once his road was opened to general traffic and 
large numbers of settlers arrived in the region, the delicate balance of race relations would 
end. "In the interests of both," he concluded, "the time has come when some provision 
should be made to meet the approaching change. He suggested that a small military force 
be maintained in the Fort Frances / Rainy River district during the "grand rendezvous" in the 
summer. In addition, a magistrate should be appointed in the community to establish a 
regular Canadian presence in the region. He also advocated the construction of a small 
stockade to ensure that the rulings of the new magistrate would be respected.’^ 
Dawson was well aware that, although the Saulteaux maintained peaceful relations 
with his largely white construction crew, they were not a people to be trifled with. 
Ironically, officials in both the American and Canadian government often took the friendship 
of the Ojibwa-speaking people of the Great Lakes Basin for granted. Dawson pointed out to 
his superiors in Ottawa that the Americans had paid a terrible price for abusing these people 
within their jurisdiction: 
... where a neighbouring tribe had lived in apparent amity for years with the 
settlers and yet rose simultaneously, in one night and committed a terrible 
massacre.^ 
^AC RGIO Vol.254 File 541 The Indians. A Report by Simon Dawson to the 
Minister of Public Works. 
Ibid. 
^ Ibid., 2-3. 
Ibid., 4. 
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Dawson was no doubt referring to the 1862 Chippewa "Disturbance" in Minnesota where in 
the fall of that year, Hole-in-the-Sky, the recognised Head Chief of the entire Ojibwa- 
speaking nation, grew impatient with the corruption of American Indian agents and went to 
war against the United States.Hole-in-the-Sky attempted to organize the Ojibwa-speaking 
people as far north as Rainy River in order the whites out of their territory. Messengers 
were sent throughout the Great Lakes Basin but he found little support for his plan beyond 
the Pillagers.’^ Nevertheless, he led his supporters against the American Indian agent in 
charge of the region. The uprising came as a shock to many settlers in Minnesota who had 
depended on the Chippewa for protection against the Sioux. During the Civil War, Hole-In- 
The-Sky, in fact, provided protection for settlers against the Sioux while the Union Army 
was fighting in the South. Before the disturbance, a newspaper reporter expressed great 
confidence in the loyalty of Chief Hole-in-the-Sky. 
Twenty U.S. troops at each fort (Ridgely and Ripley) will keep the Indians all 
right, or if they could not, Hole-in-the-Day can be safely trusted to look after 
the Sioux.’® 
In spite of this setback, Hole-in-the-Sky’s reputation as a warrior and influence as a diplomat 
’*Mark Diedrich. "Chief Hole-in-the-Day and the 1862 Chippewa Disturbance: A 
Reappraisal," Minnesota History 50, no.5 (1987): 193. 
’^Rodger Buffalohead and Pricilla K. Buifalohead, Against The Tide of American 
History: The Story of the Mille Lac Anishinabe (Cass Lake, Minnesota: The Minnesota 
Chippewa Tribe, 1985), 56. 
’®Ibid., 196. 
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was felt as far north as Rainy River and Lake of the Woods. 
Dawson wrote that a treaty with the Saulteaux would help to legitimize the Dominion 
government’s presence in their territory. He argued that such a presence was required in the 
area to limit the disputes that might be expected when the work crews were building the 
proposed transcontinental railroad through the Saulteaux lands. He foresaw many problems 
arising between the Native and non-Native population, not only during the construction of the 
railroad but also after passenger service commenced. Already the Saulteaux were 
complaining that, as more and more whites arrived in the region, the population of game was 
declining. Dawson reported that rabbits were virtually extinct and that many Amerindians 
blamed this decline on the arrival of whites.’* There is evidence, however, that, although 
fur-bearing animals like the beaver were in decline in the Little North, reports of food 
shortages among the Saulteaux in the 1870’s were greatly exaggerated by the Saulteaux. 
These complaints, nonetheless, found their way into government reports. This is not to say 
that Hudson’s Bay Company employees and government officials such as Dawson were 
misleading Ottawa but that the Saulteaux embellished their poverty to gain a competitive 
advantage in trading. Bruce M. White, in "Give Us A Little Milk: The Social and Cultural 




and time honoured practise.’’ One of these practises, in particular, proved effective during 
the treaty negotiations. In the heyday of rivalry between the Hudson’s Bay Company and the 
Northwest Company, Amerindian traders routinely complained about the quality of weapons, 
blankets and any other articles that the clerks offered in exchange for furs. As Arthur Ray 
and others have argued, the Amerindian traders effectively played one company off against 
the other to gain a competitive advantage.“ Over half a century after the amalgamation of 
the two companies, the Saulteaux confounded the Canadian authorities by praising the treaties 
their relatives had negotiated with the American government saying their annuities were 
higher, land offered as reservations was superior and the educational assistance was more 
effective than that offered by Canada.*’ Unlike the Hudson’s Bay Company, however, the 
Canadian government had means of learning the exact terms of American treaties with the 
Amerindians. 
Regardless of the economic status of the Saulteaux, Dawson did not suggest that the 
Canadian presence among the Saulteaux should be asserted only in legal authority and 
military force. He suggested that the government could create much good will by providing 
aid to those Ojibwa too old or sick to care for themselves any longer. Such a gesture would 
replace the vacuum resulting from the steady withdrawal of the Hudson’s Bay Company from 
the region following the transfer of Rupert’s Land to the Canadian government. The HBC, 
”Bruce M. White, "Give Us a Little Milk: The Social and Cultural Meanings of 
Gift Giving in the Lake Superior Fur Trade," Minnesota History 48, no. 3 (1982/83): 70. 
*°Arthur Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974). 
*’Wayne E. Daugherty, "Treaty Research Report: Treaty Three" (Ottawa: Treaties and 
Historical Research Centre, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1986), 26-7. 
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he pointed out, had provided provisions for those Saulteaux who were too old to hunt, fish, 
or gather wild rice any longer. Dawson knew that the Saulteaux had a great respect for their 
elderly and he believed that, if the government took responsibility for their care, it would 
relieve pressure on their extended families during the harsh winter months. This would not 
only have symbolic implications, according to Dawson, but also be of practical significance: 
If the aged and helpless were in the care of the government and provided for 
even in the most moderate way, it would take a great deal to excite hostility 
among the Indians.*^ 
At the same time, Dawson did not want the Saulteaux people to become economically 
dependent on the federal government. In order to avoid this danger, Dawson argued that the 
Saulteaux should be properly compensated for the loss of hunting and fishing grounds 
resulting from the construction of the Pacific railroad.® He said the treaty should anticipate 
the devastation caused by the arrival of the Pacific railroad and compensate the Saulteaux 
accordingly,*^ 
Dawson considered himself fortunate that relations between his road construction crew 
and the Saulteaux remained mostly cordial.® He warned the federal government that any 
treaty negotiations with the Saulteaux would be complicated because these people understood 
*^Dawson Collection, Report on the Indians. 8. 
"Canada, Sessional Papers, 1868, vol.31. No. 81, Simon J. Dawson, "Report on 




that their self-reliance and livelihood depended on their relationship to the land. "They are 
very intelligent and are extremely jealous as to their right of soil and authority over the 
country that they occupy.Dawson thus wrote to the Dominion government requesting 
permission to begin treaty negotiations with the Saulteaux of the Rainy River / Lake of the 
Woods region.*’ 
There is danger, however, in giving too much credence to the accounts of traders and 
government officials in the region concerning the decline in game and its impact on the 
Saulteuax. The Hudson’s Bay Company took steps to increase the beaver population during 
the nineteenth century, yet fur returns for the Lac la Puise region rivalled those of Athabasca 
and the Red River prior to the 1860’s.** Even in the United States, there was no evidence 
of a decline in fur-bearing animals as fur exports rose annually until 1880, in spite of the 
advance of settlement.*’ At any rate, Dawson believed that such declines were inevitable 
and argued that it was important to start treaty negotiations with the Saulteaux immediately. 
Dawson was concerned that news of the Riel Resistance in the Red River region might inspire 
an uprising among the Saulteaux along the Line of Route. He feared an Amerindian uprising 
86 Ibid. 
"^Ibid. 
**Hudson’s Bay Company Archives, Section B, Class 239, Subdivision H, Piece 7, 
Desciption York Factory District Fur Returns, 1840-1860. 
*’R. Gilman, "The Upper Mississippi Fur Trade," Minnestoa History 42, no. 4 
(1970-71): 123. 
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that would result in many deaths among the small non-Native population.^ He was anxious 
that agents representing the Metis might try to agitate the Saulteaux to interfere with the 
expected movement of troops through their territory. In spite of the risks, Dawson concluded 
that the resistance in the Red River Colony provided an opportunity to open negotiations with 
the Saulteaux he and remained optimistic that a treaty was possible as well as necessary if 
peace were to be maintained in the region.*^^ 
Another agent working for Morris who knew the Saulteaux well was Richard Pither. 
Pither had a long association with both Dawson and the Saulteaux along the Line of Route. 
He initially worked for the Hudson Bay’s Company at Rainy River and Fort William. 
During Wemyss Simpson’s unsuccessful attempts at arrive at a treaty with the Saulteaux, 
Pither was the Canadian government’s Indian agent in the region. Pither worked closely with 
Dawson on a number of negotiations with the Saulteaux during the construction of his road 
and provided frequent reports to Morris during the year leading up to the Treaty Three 
negotiations. Unfortunately, his correspondence has not survived as well as Dawson’s has. 
What reports still exist are found in the Red and Black Series of the Indian Affairs documents 
as well as in the Morris Papers. 
The papers of Adams Archibald, Lieutenant-Governor of Manitoba during the Treaty 
One and Two negotiations as well as the first attempts to achieve a treaty with the Saulteaux, 
’’^Public Archives of Manitoba. Adams Archibald Lieutenant-Governor’s Collection 
1869-1872. Memorandum in Reference to the Indians on the Red River Route, Simon 
Dawson, Ottawa to Howe, Ottawa, December 1869. 
’%id. 
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provides another source of information on the Amerindians of the region. During his term as 
Lieutenant-Governor, Archibald was clearly overwhelmed by events in Manitoba. The 
arrival of more and more Sioux refugees from the United States, conflicts between white 
settlers and the Metis and the other Amerindians, and the continuing presence of Louis Riel 
and his followers taxed his ability to govern. Unfortunately, his reliance on Wemyss 
Simpson to negotiate with the Saulteaux on his behalf largely contributed to the initial failure 
to achieve a treaty with them. The pressence of the Lieutenent-Govemor in Saulteaux 
country would have made an agreement possible. Nevertheless, Archibald had more face-to- 
face contact with the Saulteaux east of Fort Garry during his term as Lieutenant-Governor 
than Morris ever had. He took opportunities to hunt in the region and apparently met some 
Saulteaux chiefs. In his papers, Archibald’s opinions regarding the Saulteaux and their 
territories were based largely on these hunting trips and his conversations with a Metis who 
led the Saulteaux living near Fort Garry. 
Alexander Morris, who succeeded Archibald in 1873, however, was better equipped 
to execute his role as Lieutenant-Governor in Manitoba. His success in signing a treaty with 
the Saulteaux was a direct result of his preparation for the negotiations. It was this 
preparation that gives the researcher a clearer picture of the Saulteaux position since Morris 
was a practical man who was less interested in Victorian philosophy than in achieving 
results.^ 
Other sources shed light on the Saulteaux negotiating position during the Treaty 
”C. Ratkoff-Rojnoif, "The Nolin-Paypom Treaty and Wild Rice." as found at the 
Claims and Historical Research Centre, Indian and Northern Affairs Department, Ottawa, 9. 
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Three talks. There are newspaper accounts of the negotiations themselves as well as stories 
relating to early complaints against the Canadian government. The most important non- 
governmental source of information concerning the Saulteaux negotiating position remains the 
Paypom Treaty, the document understood by the Saulteaux chiefs to be the real Treaty Three 
agreement. It confirms that promises relating to wild rice, hunting and fishing were made 
during the negotiations.^^ The latter became a serious issue when American and Canadian 
commercial fishermen plundered the Lake of the Woods region. Speaking in the House of 
Commons, Dawson reiterated his claim that the Saulteaux had not surrendered their fishing 
rights in the region when they signed Treaty Three. Chief Sacheway, too, challenged the 
right of white commercial fishermen to harvest on Lake of the Woods. He said that when his 
people surrendered their land, they did not surrender their resources, including fish.’^ There 
are still other ways to ascertain the treaty demands of the Saulteaux. To discover the 
Saulteaux position, researchers must utilize a number of different approaches. Researchers 
must consider remarks made by both parties concerning the treaty many years later, like the 
ones Dawson made in the House of Commons with respect to Saulteaux fishing rights in the 
region. More valuable are petitions from the Amerindians to the Government of Canada 
which shed light on misunderstandings of the treaty itself. 
What is clear, despite the ambiguities involved, is that the two parties did not speak 
^Grand Council Treaty Three affirms that the legitimate agreement reached between 
the Government of Canada and their people was the Paypom Treaty, not the version 
published in the Gazette. Obviously, the federal government disagrees. 
^Leo Waisberg and Tim Holzkamm, The Document Published by Canada as Treaty 
^ Treaty and Aboriginal Rights Research of Grand Council Treaty #3, 1992. 
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the same language, either literally or figuratively. The Saulteaux could not read the language 
in which the treaty was written. The translators who could read it were in the pay of the 
federal government and were principally French, although James MacKay was obviously an 
Anglophone. Many of the terms in the treaty were of a legal nature and had no 
corresponding words in the Ojibwa world view. The Saulteaux understanding of the treaty 
was limited to what could be explained to them by translators who were more skilled in the 
fur trade, than in legal terminology. There were also major cultural differences between the 
two parties that Morris chose to discount. As a Euro-Canadian trained in the British legal 
tradition, Morris regarded that Saulteaux silence on a variety of issues was acceptance of an 
idea. Silence had quite the opposite meaning for the Saulteaux; silence meant that no 
consensus had yet been reached.” Finally, Ebenezer McCole, an inspector for the 
Dominion government, confirmed in his 1880 Annual Report that promises made to the 
Saulteaux had not been included in the final draft of the treaty. 
The protection of Saulteaux farmland in their territory was a serious concern for the 
Saulteaux negotiators, yet, there is no reference to it in the Treaty Three document published 
by the Canadian government. Like other promises made to them, references to agriculture 
are found in both the Paypom Treaty and in the notes of Morris’ shorthand reporter. 
Agricultural activities provided the Saulteaux with an ever increasing portion of their food 
"Office of the Attorney General of Ontario and the Multicultural Association of 
Kenora and District, Proceedings of Indian Ways - Indian Thinking: A Dialogue Between 
Clare Brant and Bruce Sealy (Kenora, Ontario: n.p,, 1988), 53-55. 
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supply by the 1870’s.^ Saulteaux farmers were trading agricultural products to fur traders 
as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century. As the population nearly tripled, 
Saulteaux farm production provided an important source of food for the Amerindians in the 
region. According to the researchers for Grand Council Treaty Three, Leo G. Waisberg and 
Tim E. Holzkamm, the desire of the Saulteaux to expand their agricultural initiatives was a 
key reason why Treaty Three was negotiated in the first place.^ It was not until Canadian 
legislation restricted the commercial sale of Saulteaux farm produce in 1881, combined with 
the flooding of their lands as a result of the damming of the Rainy River, that the Saulteaux 
abandoned agriculture and turned once again to hunting and gathering and wage labour in the 
growing resource industries as their means of subsistence. 
By 1890, it was generally recognised that the text of Treaty Three as published by the 
Canadian government was not a complete record of the agreement between Morris and the 
Saulteaux of Northwestern Ontario. In addition, there were many differences between the 
Canadian government and the Saulteaux regarding the interpretation of Treaty Three. The 
government had seen the signing of the treaty as the final step in achieving the Saulteaux land 
surrender. The Saulteaux saw the signing of the treaty, however, as merely the first step in a 
series of discussions that would include such outstanding issues as fishing and hunting rights 
“Wayne Moodie, "The Northern Limits of Ojibwa Agriculture" Geography Review 
1969: Leo G. Waisberg and Tim E. Holzkamm, "‘A Tendency to Discourage Them From 
Cultivating’: Ojibwa Agriculture and Indian Affairs Administration in Northwestern Ontario" 
in Ethnohistory 40, no. 2 (1993) and the later in "The Rise of Ojibwa Gardening After 1862" 
Ethnohistory 
^Waisberg and Holzkamm, "Ojibwa Agriculture", Ethnohistory 1. 
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throughout the region. The Saulteaux maintained that they had held unconditional title to 
their land and had no intention of surrendering it in a treaty with the Canadian government. 
Chief Posh-King-On said during the negotiations that "this is Indians’; not white man’s 
country."’^ The Saulteaux were prepared to grant a right of way for the Pacific railroad but 
they were not willing to transfer title to the land. 
Beyond these primary sources, a growing body of historical discussions of Treaty 
Three has clarified the Saulteaux position during the face-to-face negotiations. J.E. Foster 
has argued that the Saulteaux enjoyed more success in negotiating Treaty Three than the 
Plains Cree did in later treaties because they were exposed to European contact earlier than 
the Amerindians of Western Canada and, as a result, had a better understanding of Euro- 
Canadians. Their exposure to the fur trade, he says, gave them a clearer concept of their 
own rights in terms of Canadian demands.^ Frank J. Tough has provided ample evidence 
that the Canadian government recognised that Amerindian title to the former HBC territory 
was a serious obstacle to westward expansion.^” The Canadian government recognised that 
the Amerindians of the former Rupert’s Land were entitled to compensation following the 
settlement of the Hudson’s Bay Company. 
’*NAC, MG 29, C 67, Dawson Notes on Treaty #3 Negotiations. 
”J.E. Foster, "The Saulteaux and the Numbered Treaties: An Aboriginal Rights 
Position" in The Spirit of Indian Treaties, ed. Richard Price (Toronto: Butterworth and 
Company, 1979), 161-80. 
‘“Frank J. Tough, "Aboriginal Rights Versus the Deed of Surrender: The Legal 
Rights of Native Peoples and Canada’s Acquisition of the Hudson’s Bay Company Territory," 
Prairie Forum 17, no. 2 (Fall 1992): 225-62. 
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The varied sources provides a clear picture of the Saulteaux’s basic treaty demands. 
The Saulteaux rejected every overture made by the federal government to obtain an out-right 
transfer of their land title from 1869 to 1873. Four times the government failed to convince 
the Saulteaux to surrender their land. Each time, government officials complained that the 
Saulteaux negotiating position was "unreasonable.” OHve Dickason argues that the Saulteaux 
remained firm on their basic demands because they had learned from the bitter lessons of 
other Amerindians both in the East and the South. 
The better terms of Treaty Three reflected the greater familarity of the 
Amerindians of the area with the governmental negotiating process and their 
greater political assertiveness.^®^ 
As a result, the Saulteaux may have demanded from the Canadian government simply what 
they understood their "cousins" in Minnesota had received from the United States government 
during the 1854 negotiations at La Pointe. More likely, they were pressing the Canadian 
authorities to keep their treaty promises unlike the American government. Jean Friesen is no 
doubt correct when she argues that the Saulteaux recognised that their livelihood and their 
freedom sprang from the land and were convinced that, if the government wanted their land, 
it would have to compensate them for it.‘“ At the very least, the Saulteaux wanted reserves 
with good farm land, agricultural implements, technical support staff including teachers and a 
generous annuity in return for any land that was surrendered for the construction of new 
transportation systems in the region. In fact, the Saulteaux position had changed little since 
1869 when Wemyss Simpson was commissioned to seek assurances from them that they 
^®^Dickason, Canada’s First Nations. 280. 
'“Friesen, "Magnificent Gifts", 43. 
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would not interfere with Colonel G. J. Wolseley and the troops who would be travelling 
through the territory on their way to establish Canadian authority in the Red River 
Settlement. 
It has been pointed out that the Canadian Indian policy of the late nineteenth century 
was not "deliberate, wise, and benevolent" as asserted in the official records and secondary 
accounts based on them. It was the Saulteaux themselves who recognized not only the value 
of their land but also their need to adapt to the changes caused by the encroaching white 
presence in their territory. Although it paid lip service to the idea, the Canadian government 
was not interested in assisting this "vanishing people" to adapt to modem society. In both 
American and Canadian government circles, many believed that Amerindians were doomed to 
suffer "extinction" according to the laws of Social Darwinism. Both governments were more 
concerned about removing what they perceived to be obstacles in the path of trade and 
commerce rather than in aiding Amerindians in their adaptation to "modem ways".^“ In 
order for the government to achieve its objectives, it would have to remain patient. Time, 
however, was not on the side of the Saulteaux. 
^”John Leonard Taylor, "Canada’s North-West Indian Policy in the 1870’s: 
Traditional Premises and Necessary Innovations," Sweet Promises A Reader on Indian - 
White Relations In Canada, ed. J.R.Miller (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1991), 
208-10. 
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CHAPTER THREE: EARLY CANADIAN ATTEMPTS TO NEGOTIATE A TREATY 
Simon Dawson played a key role in drawing the attention of the Canadian government 
to the need to negotiate a treaty with the Saulteaux. He first made contact with the Saulteaux 
in the 1850’s when he was part of the Hind expedition commissioned to explore Rupert’s Land 
for the Province of Canada West and assess its agricultural potential.^®* His first meeting with 
the Saulteaux was less than ideal. He reported that they were angered that the party had not first 
sought their permission to cross their territory. In spite of that unfortunate first encounter, 
Dawson gradually won the respect of the Saulteaux as he surveyed the Red River Route later 
oversaw the construction of the Dawson Road, named in his honour. The Dawson Road snaked 
along the Saulteaux territory generally, following the old route of the fiir traders from the 
Lakehead to Fort Garry. Dawson, himself, admitted that without the assistance of the Saulteaux 
as guides it would have been nearly impossible to construct a transportation system through the 
many bogs and swamps of the region. Throughout his years in their territory, Dawson prepared 
many reports to Ottawa regarding the Saulteaux and outlining various policies that he believed 
that the Canadian government should pursue in the region. 
As an entrepreneur, Dawson was concerned that the profitability of his road once 
completed would depend on peaceful relations with the Saulteaux, otherwise, setders on their 
way to the Red River Colony would seek alternative routes. Dawson’s ideas on maintaining 
peace relations changed over the years. During the construction phase, he advocated that the 
government seek only a right of way through the Saulteaux country. As the road neared 
completion, however, Dawson began to realize that there were profits to be made in land 
'®^L.H. Thomas, ’’The Hind and Dawson Expeditions, 1857-58", The Beaver (Winter 
1958), 39-45. 
speculation in the region, particularly in mining and farming. Soon, he was calling on the 
Canadian government to negotiate a comprehensive treaty with the Saulteaux. It is not surprising 
that he was an early advocate of peaceful relations with them and remained so to the end of his 
life. The Red River Resistance of 1869-1870 occurred at an opportune time for Dawson. He 
saw the uprising as an opportunity to put forward his case for a comprehensive treaty with the 
Saulteaux. In a memorandum, he reiterated his concerns regarding the dangers of a Saulteaux 
uprising in the region and noted that relations between the races were rapidly declining. In 
addition, he expressed, once again, anxiety over reports that both American entrepreneurs and 
Metis agents representing Louis Riel were operating along the Line of Route. He pressed 
the government to begin treaty negotiations with the Saulteaux the following spring. 
Dawson’s concerns did not fall on deaf ears. Joseph Howe, the Secretary of State for the 
Provinces, instructed Dawson to prepare for treaty negotiations with the Saulteaux which would 
be held no latter than the summer of 1870. Howe also accepted Dawson’s advice regarding the 
employment of Richard Pither to ascertain the treaty demands of the Saulteaux in the Fort 
Frances area. Pither, an employee of the Hudson’s Bay Company, had had extensive experience 
with the Saulteaux. Dawson instructed Pither to hire Nicolas Chatelain, a respected Metis 
leader, to act as an interpreter for the Canadians. The trio of Dawson, Pither, and Chatelain 
would prove instrumental in the eventual negotiation of Treaty Three in 1873. 
Nevertheless, as issues in Manitoba came to dominate the agenda of the Canadian 
government, cabinet turned its attention away from addressing the demands of the Saulteaux and 
‘“Provincial Archives of Manitoba, Alexander Morris, Lieutenant-Governor’s Collection, 
1872-1877, MG12, Al, Memorandum from S.J. Dawson, 17 December 1869. (Cited 
hereafter as PAM). 
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towards reinforcing its authority in the Red River Settlement.In spite of George E. Cartier’s 
objections, Prime Minister John A. Macdonald wanted to establish a military presence in the Red 
River Settlement as a show of Dominion strength in the region. The prime minister warned of 
the danger of American expansion to the North-West Territories, this, in spite, of the American 
government’s position of neutrality in the region. In a letter, Macdonald expressed a popular 
view in Canada when he wrote "that the United States’ government are resolved to do all they 
can, short of war, to get possession of the western territory, and we must take immediate and 
vigorous steps to counteract them."“” James Snell challenged this notion by saying that 
President U.S. Grant and his administration were sincere in remaining neutral regardless of the 
rocky' relations between the two countries.^®* Still, given the context of the times, Macdonald 
wanted a military force to arrive at Fort Garry as quickly as possible follow'ing the passage of 
the Manitoba Act in 1870 and appointment of Adams G. Achibald as Lieutenant-Governor for 
the new province and surrounding territory. 
To ensure that their troops would not be interfered with along the way, the Canadian 
cabinet passed an Order-In-Council to seek assurances from the Amerindians that their troops 
would enjoy safe passage along the Dawson Road. The 1871 Annual Report of the Department 
of Indian Affairs said in part: 
‘“Donald Creighton, John A. Macdonald: The Old Chieftain (Toronto: The Macmillian 
Company of Canada Limited, 1955), 67-68. 
“^Creighton, The Old Chieftain: 54-55. This quote has been used by various historians 
interested in the American role during the Red River Resistance. See Gluek, Minnesota. 
Manifest Destiny and the Canadian North-West. Chapter 9. 
‘“James G. Snell, "American Neutrality and the Red River Resistance, 1869-1870," 
Prairie Forum 4. no. 2 (1979): 183-96, 
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In anticipation of the movement of troops across the country lying between Thunder Bay and 
Manitoba, in 1870, agents were employed to visit the Indians tribes along the line of route, to 
conciliate them with presents, and to assure them that while a peaceful right of way for Troops 
and Emigrants only was required, the Government would be prepared, at a convenient season, 
to compensate them for their friendly co-operation, and to cover by a treaty any lands which they 
might be willing to part with and the Government deemed it politic to acquire.'” 
Meanwhile, the government ordered Colonel Garnet Wolseley to lead the military force to Fort 
Garry. In order that these troops would not encounter any unnecessary delays while travelling 
across the Dawson Road, Howe revised his instructions concerning formal treaty talks with the 
Aboriginal peoples of Manitoba and the North West Territories. Dawson, leader of the advance 
party, was charged specifically with the responsibility of seeking assurances from the Saulteuax 
that they would not interfere with the military force passing through their territory. He passed 
on the government’s instructions to Pither and kept both the new Lieutenant-Governor in Fort 
Garry and the Secretary of State in Ottawa abreast of the situation unfolding among the Saulteaux 
at Fort Frances and around the Lake of the Woods. Pither and Dawson both provided Ottawa 
and Fort Garry with valuable information concerning the negotiating position of the Saulteaux. 
In addition to gathering information, the team was instructed to ascertain support for a treaty 
with the Canadian government. Pither, in particular, was instructed to promise the Saulteaux 
that the government would treat them fairly and that they would benefit in material terms from 
signing a treaty with Canada."® The government also wanted the team to thwart any initiatives 
'^Canada, Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report. 1871. Secretary of State 
for the Provinces, Joseph Howe to his Excellency the Right Honourable Lord Lisgar, 
Governor-General of Canada, 17 April 1871, 3-4 as cited in Wayne E. Daugherty, Treaty 
Research Report: Treaty Three (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1986), 14-15 
"®PAM Archibald Lieutenant-Governor’s Collection 1869-1872. Instructions. 
Dawson, Toronto, to Pither, Fort William. 6 January 1870. 
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by agents of Riel operating among the Sauiteaux. Members of the team were strictly forbidden, 
however, from confronting any of the Metis "agitators".*” By February, 1870, Pither was 
reporting that the Sauiteaux looked favourably upon treaty talks with the Canadian government.**^ 
He began trying to establish the terms on which the Sauiteaux would be willing to accept a treaty 
with Ottawa. 
After studying the Pither reports, the government was confident that the Sauiteaux would 
not ally themselves formally with the Metis resistance in Manitoba. Nevertheless, Ottawa was 
still concerned that the Sauiteaux might inhibit the passage of government troops on their way 
to Manitoba. Military officials were convinced that the active support of the Sauiteaux as 
labourers and voyageurs was essential if troops were to arrive soon in Manitoba.**^ 
By this time, the Canadian government was preoccupied with the crisis in the Red River. 
It informed Pither and Dawson that it had appointed Wemyss Simpson, Indian Commissioner and 
that they were to assist him in his formal treaty talks with the Sauiteaux. His instructions, 
however, indicate no reference to comprehensive negotiations. Instead, the government simply 
wanted him to seek assurances from the Sauiteaux that the Canadian troops would not be 
*”Ibid. 
**^PAM Archibald Collection. Pither, Fort William, to Dawson, Ottawa, 8 February 
1870. 
**^PAM Archibald Collection. Donald A. Smith to Sir George Cartier, 19 April 
1870. 
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interfered with as they passed through the Lake of the Woods region in May 1870."'^ Simpson 
interpreted his instructions in the strictest possible sense and, unlike Dawson, demonstrated little 
initiative in spite of the fact that the Saulteaux at the time appeared to be willing to reach an 
agreement. Lieutenant-Governor Adams Archibald blamed Simpson for not only failing to reach 
an agreement with the Saulteaux but for actually making relations between the two parties 
worse.Still, it was the federal government which instructed him simply to seek only 
assurances that military personnel would not be attacked or interfered with on their way to the 
Red River Settlement and that surveying crews could carry on with their work uninhibited.”*^ 
There was much concern, both in political and military circles, that the Saulteaux could wreak 
havoc with the government’s efforts to put down Riel if they interfered with the transportation 
of troops travelling to Manitoba. Captain Huyshe of the expedition later wrote: 
There is no doubt that a hundred determined men might have inflicted tremendous loss 
on the troops with comparative impunity; for, thoroughly acquainted with the vast network of 
lakes, they could have &ed on the boats as they passed though narrow channels, or blocked up 
the portages, and done much mischief in a variety of ways, while to have attempted to pursue 
them through the woods and lakes would have been madness.”^ 
The government no doubt was less interested in signing a formal treaty with the Saulteaux 
”'‘PAM Archibald Collection. Howe to Wemyss M. Simpson, M.P., Fort Frances, 
17 May 1870. 
'”PAM, Archibald Collection, MG12-A1, Despatch Book 3, Letter No. 20. Archibald to 
Secretary of State, 1872. 
”®PAM, Archibald Collection. Secretary of State Joseph Howe to Wemyss M. Simpson, 
M.P., 17 May, 1870. 
“’George F.G. Stanley, The Birth of Western Canada: A History of the Riel 
Rebellions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 136. 
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than it was with putting down Riel and his supporters in the 1870’s.“* These negotiations in 
the spring of 1870, however, confirmed some of the government’s worst fears. Many more 
Saulteaux, a significant number from the United States, arrived at the talks in 1870 than Simpson 
had anticipated and their expectations concerning a formal treaty were high.”’ Although they 
agreed to guarantee the safety of the soldiers passing though their lands on the way to the Red 
River settlement, they refused to assist the soldiers as guides or labourers. Simpson blamed 
Riel’s agents for the imcooperative attitude of the Saulteaux: 
The Half Breeds and the Indians of Red River had been tampering with them 
telling them that the Troops were going to the Settlement to take their lands from 
them by force and advising the Rainy River Indians not to assist the soldiers, 
make any treaty or receive any presents this year.”® 
On the other hand, the Red River resistance seemed of little consequence to the Saulteaux. 
Instead, they were eager to discuss their grievances, which they believed could only be addressed 
in a formal treaty with the government. Simpson was unwilling to listen to any of the Saulteaux 
concerns outside the terms of his instructions. Recognising this, the Saulteaux concluded that 
he lacked the authority to negotiate for the Crown and subsequently gave him a message to the 
Dominion government. In it, they listed their demands, including their terms for a treaty, and 
stated their concern about the construction of a Pacific railroad through their territory. They 
insisted that Simpson pass their message to the nearest Indian agent. 
”*Wayne E. Daugherty, "Treaty Research Report: Treaty Three” (Ottawa: Treaties 
and Historical Research Centre, Research Branch, Corporate Policy, Department of Indian 
Affairs, 1981), 16-17. 
“’PAM, Archibald Collection, Wemyss M. Simpson to Secretary of State Joseph Howe, 
19 August, 1870. 
”®Ibid. 
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Following these talks, Simpson reported to Howe that a Saulteaux chief was quite specific 
about his grievances with the government. The Saulteaux wanted proper compensation for 
the building of the Dawson Road and demanded regular payment from those who intended to use 
it. They insisted that no white farmers would be welcome in their territory and they expected 
an annual payment of ten dollars for every man, woman, and child and enough provisions to 
support them through the winter months.Later, Simpson reported that the chief said: 
...that we expect an answer to our demand sent to Mr. Pither during the winter 
so that we may know how to act and when we assemble for payment. For this 
we are willing to allow the Queen’s subjects the right of passage through our 
lands, to build and run steamers, build canals and rail roads and to take up 
sufficient land for buildings for Government use - but we will not take your 
presents, they are a bait and if we take them you will say we are bound to 
you.‘^ 
Like other Canadians negotiating treaties with the Amerindians at that time, Simpson did not 
understand the nature of the Saulteaux demands. The Saulteaux, like other Aboriginal peoples 
in the West, were prepared to grant safe passage to the Crown’s subjects travelling through their 
territories for a small annuity as long as title to their lands was respected. However, the 
compensation increased dramatically when the Canadians demanded a complete surrender of the 
lands from which they derived their economic security. The Canadian government, like the 
United States, saw land as a commodity which could be bought and sold. Beyond its spiritual 
significance, the Saulteaux saw the land in terms of subsistence: If they were going to trade that, 
^^^PAM Archibald Collection. Howe to Archibald, 23 September 1870. 
^Ibid. 
‘“PAM, Archibald Collection, Wemyss M. Simpson M.P. to Joseph Howe, 
Secretary of State Joseph Howe, 17 May 1870. 
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then they would have to receive an alternate method of livelihood.*^ Simpson, like other 
Canadians, balked at these demands, saying that the Dominion would never agree to pay so 
much. The Canadian government was adamant that "its" Aboriginal peoples could expect no 
more, and probably much less, for the negotiation of the numbered treaties than their relatives 
had received under agreements signed with the American government. Simpson was quick to 
point out that the American government had paid far less for the territory once occupied by the 
Chippewa at La Pointe in 1854.*^ He was certain that the government would guarantee annuity 
payments only for a fixed term as their American counterparts had done. In spite of his efforts, 
however, he was unsuccessful in convincing the Saulteaux that the government would not give 
in to their demands. Simpson appeared to have blamed Dawson for raising the expectations of 
the Saulteaux in the Lake of the Woods area. According to Simpson, Dawson had successfully 
negotiated safe passage through the Rainy River area for the Dominion soldiers by offering Chief 
Blackstone and his people generous gifts.Like many whites of the time and since, Simpson 
greatly underestimated the negotiating ability of Amerindians. 
Secretary of State Howe was disappointed with Simpson’s report and asked for more 
information regarding the Saulteaux treaty demands. Expectations among them for negotiations 
aimed at a formal treaty were high, and there were fears that a widespread uprising would erupt 
in the region. In October, however, Either informed the government that the entire region was 
*^Jean Friesen, "Magnificent Gifts": The Treaties of Canad with the Indians of the 
Northwest, 1869-76" Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada Series V, Volume 1, 1986, 
43. 
*“PAM, Archibald Collection, Wemyss M. Simpson to Secretary of State Joseph Howe, 
19 August 1870. 
*“Ibid. 
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peaceful as the "Indians were off to the Hunting Grounds. Amerindian unrest was limited 
to a few minor incidents of looting and threats made against whites who were cutting timber 
without first seeking the consent of the Saulteaux.^ Nevertheless, Howe subsequently 
requested Lieutenant-Governor Archibald to address the outstanding issues raised by the 
Amerindians along the Line of Route.Unfortunately, Archibald was preoccupied with the 
unstable situation around Fort Gany' and unfamiliar with the situation along the Dawson Road. 
He was forced to delegate face-to-face negotiations to Simpson. He informed Howe that he 
would need until the following spring to become fully informed of the Saulteaux situation. Any 
current knowledge he had regarding the Saulteaux was limited to the information that he was able 
to glean from his acquaintance with Henry Prince, a chief of the Plains Ojibwa in Manitoba. 
In fact, his interest in the North West Angle waned as tensions increased closer to Fort Garry 
between the Amerindians and white settlers. In Manitoba, Amerindians were preventing settlers 
from constructing any permanent buildings outside the Selkirk settlement until treaties were 
signed and reserves surveyed. Settlers were asking Archibald to call out the troops to defend 
their interests against a feared uprising. Archibald declined, saying that even the appearance of 
soldiers might provoke violence. The situation was reaching a critical stage by the end of 1870. 
^^^PAM Archibald Collection. Robert Pither, Fort Frances, to (Archibald) 14 
October 1870. 
^“PAM Archibald Collection. Robert Pither, Fort Frances to (Archibald) 14 October 
1870. 
^^^AM Archibald Collection. Secretary of State Joseph Howe to Lieutenant- 
Governor of Manitoba, A.G. Archibald, 23 September 1870. 
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Archibald ordered Pither to postpone the planned negotiations with the Saulteaux. Instead, he 
turned his attention to the Cree to whom he had promised treaty talks in exchange for peace. 
The Governor did instruct Pither to carry on with his work among the Saulteaux and to gather 
intelligence that would prove useful in new talks expected in the spring. 
Archibald was more optimistic that he could reach agreements with the Amerindians who 
occupied the territory closer to Fort Garry than with the Saulteaux along the Line of Route. In 
his report to Howe, Archibald expressed concern about the financial implications of a treaty with 
the Saulteaux along the Line of Route. He argued that Ottawa could afford to pay the Cree 
occupying the Prairies far more than the Woodland people of the Lac la Pluie region because the 
government could expect to receive a high return on the Cree land once white settlers arrived and 
began farming. He questioned whether the government could ever recover monies paid to the 
Saulteaux under any negotiated treaty. It is not clear why he underestimated the value of the 
timber and mining potential in Saulteaux territory. Minnestota was experiencing an economic 
boom when Archibald was writing his report, to say nothing of Dawson’s reports indicating that 
Americans were surveying mining sites in the Saulteaux territory. The Saulteaux were certainly 
aware of the mineral wealth of their territory.Nevertheless, Archibald who was preoccupied 
^^AM Archibald Collection. Archibald’s Reply to the Cree, 4 January 1871. 
^'PAM Archibald Collection. Archibald to Robert Pither. 27 November 1870. 
'^^Treaty talks between Canada and the Saulteaux in 1872 broke down over the issue of 
royalties for mineral rights. According to the Commissioners report, "they are well informed 
as to the discovery of gold and silver to the west of the watershed, and have not been slow to 
give us their views as to the value of that discovery." As cited in "The Mineral Rights of 
Treaty #3 Indians" Treaty and Aboriginal Rights Research Grand Council Treaty #3, April 
1992. 
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with thoughts of agricultural settlement wrote to Howe that their lands were virtually worthless: 
So far therefore as the question of the value of Indian claims depends on the character of the soil 
between the North West Angle of the Lake of the Woods and the Eastern shore of Lake 
Shabandowan I should not consider the fee simple of the entire country, for agricultural 
purposes, with as much as 100 acres of the Prairie of Red River.*” 
Archibald did not share Dawson’s optimism that his road would be a commercial success. 
Settlers travelling to homestead on the Prairies, he believed, would rather travel relatively 
quickly and safely by rail through the United States across Minnesota instead of using the 
Dawson Road with its many portages and hazards. Traffic, not surprisingly, w^as low on the 
Dawson Road. There was fear, however, particularly in the Ontario legislature, that, once they 
were in the United States, many of these settlers were lost to Canada forever. 
The major issue in Archibald’s mind was fiscal responsibility. He concluded that the 
Canadian government would have to pay the Saulteaux out of general revenues. As a result, he 
advised the government not to establish a formal treaty relationship with these people and 
suggested that it would be more expeditious to resolve conflicts as they arose.*” Ironnically, 
virtually all of the major recommendations made originally by Simpson to Howe were echoed 
by Archibald in his correspondence to the minister.*” Dawson, learning of Archibald’s 
assessment of the situation along the Line of Route, prepared his own report to Hector-Louis 
*”PAM, Archibald Collection, Adams G. Archibald to Secretaiy of State Howe, 12 
November 1870. 
*^Friesen, "Morris"; 610. 
*”Ibid. 
*”Daugherty, "Research Report", 12. 
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Langevin, the Minister of Public Works. Langevin was familiar with many of the concerns 
Dawson expressed since he had been Superintendent of Indian Affairs when the Red River 
Resistance began. It is not clear if Dawson’s recommendations arrived in time to influence 
cabinet deliberations and, if they did, what weight they carried. The cabinet, however, remained 
committed to a policy of limited agreements with the Saulteaux rather than a comprehensive 
treaty. 
According to Wayne Daugherty, a researcher with the Claims and Historical Research 
Branch of Indian and Northern Affairs, the government was forced to reverse this policy and, 
by 1871, demanded that the Saulteaux surrender all their lands along the Line of Route and sent 
appropriate instructions to Archibald. The new federal policy was unacceptable to the Saulteaux, 
however, who continued to resist the idea of any large land surrender. Yet, in spite of their 
respective positions, both sides continued to make overtures to each other regarding a formal 
treaty.In the spring of 1871, Simpson was given another chance by cabinet to negotiate a 
treaty with the Saulteaux. He was assisted once again by Dawson and Pither.^” The federal 
government was anxious to reopen treaty talks with the Saulteaux for fear of trouble resulting 
from the launching of steamers on Rainy Lake, Sturgeon Lake and Lake of the Woods. The 
Canadian government believed that the steamers would be attacked by the Saulteaux if a treaty 
‘^^PAM Archibald Collection. S.J. Dawson, Ottawa, to Hector-Louis Langevin, 
Minister of Public Works, Ottawa. 19 December 1870. 
^^^vidence that the Saulteaux were still interested in a formal treaty with the Canadian 
government can be found in PAM, Archibald Collection, Memorandum from S.J. Dawson to 
H.L. Langevin, 7 February 1871. 
^”PAM Archibald Collection. Howe to Archibald. 29 March 1871. 
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with them was not negotiated.To ensure that the transportation system would remain open 
in the interim, the government appointed James McKay (1828-1879) to communicate its 
intentions regarding the steamships and the road to the Saulteaux.^'^^ 
McKay certainly deserves more credit than he has received so far for his role in, not only 
the successful negotiation of Treaty Three, but for the other numbered treaties as well.^'*^ 
McKay, a former Hudson’s Bay Company employee, was a Metis leader, influential with both 
Native and non-Natives alike.^'*^ He was an experienced guide popular with the territory’s elite 
such as George Simpson, head of the Hudson’s Bay Company. During the Pallister expedition 
across the Prairies in the 1850’s, he was the chief guide. Following his departure from the 
Hudson’s Bay Company, he played an active role in the politics of Manitoba and the North-West 
Territories. In 1871, he was appointed by Adams Archibald to the Manitoba Legislative Council 
and was president of the executive council as well as a representative on the North-West Council. 
He would participate in the upcoming negotiations that led to the signing of Treaties One and 
Two.'"^ The government would also turn to him to deal with the thorny issue of the "outside" 
‘'“PAM Archibald Collection. Howe to Archibald. 13 February 1871. 
‘'‘‘PAM Archibald Collection. Howe to Archibald. 17 April 1871. 
‘'‘^Guy R. Joubert, "A Biographical Sketch of James McKay" (Kenora: Treaty and 
Aboriginal Rights Reseach of Grand Council Treaty Three, u.p. 30 June 1983), 4-5. 
Allan R. Turner, "James McKay" Dictionary of Canadian Biography (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1982); vol. 10, 474. 
‘^Ibid., 473-475. 
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promises made during the Treaty One and Two negotiations. 
In spite of his new instructions from the Canadian government, Archibald remained 
pessimistic about negotiating a comprehensive treaty with the Saulteaux. In a letter to the 
governor, the Secretary of State reiterated the importance of securing a treaty with the Saulteaux 
and made clear that he wanted an agreement reached no later than the end of that year.^^ The 
Canadian cabinet was overly optimistic. It expected Simpson to conclude treaties not only with 
the Saulteaux but also with the various First Nations in Manitoba between Lake Superior and the 
"Stone Fort," otherwise known as Fort Garry.Pressure continued to mount in Manitoba as 
Amerindian communities demanded that the government negotiate treaties with them. Even as 
Simpson was preparing to depart for talks with the Saulteaux, Aboriginal leaders at Portage la 
Prairie threatened to resist the government until a treaty was signed. The Lieutenant- 
Governor feared that blood would be spilled if some action were not taken in Manitoba first. 
In spite of the growing danger in Manitoba, Ottawa was still not willing to grant Simpson 
more discretionary power to negotiate a quick settlement with the Saulteaux.^'*’ Talks began 
in June. Dawson was late in arriving at the negotiations and Simpson was unable to achieve an 
'^Joubert, "James McKay" TARR, 6. 
^^PAM Archibald Collection. Howe to Archibald. 17 April 1871. 
^^^PAM Archibald Collection. Howe to Archibald. 28 April 1871. 
^'“PAM Archibald Collection. Resolution of Indians at Portage la Prairie. 30 May 
1871. 
^^PAM Archibald Collection. Howe to Archibald. 13 June 1871. 
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agreement with the Saulteaux without the help of the Scottish engineer. Simpson rejected 
all of the basic demands put forward by the Saulteaux, which had not changed significantly since 
the time of the Red River Resistance. With Dawson present, the two parties began serious 
negotiations and arrived at a tentative agreement. Unfortunately, a disease, perhaps measles, 
broke out and the Saulteaux dispersed before the agreement could be signed. Nevertheless, 
there was speculation that the Saulteaux departed early and declined to negotiate further until a 
Crown representative was present. 
This tentative agreement is an important one. Not only did it represent the first time that 
the two parties reached such a comprehensive agreement but also because there is growing 
evidence that the treaty signed by Morris and the Saulteaux in 1873 did not represent the actual 
negotiations but was merely a copy of the tentative agreement reached earlier by Simpson and 
Dawson.Dawson may have actually drafted the text of Treaty Three in 1872 prior to the 
Archibald Collection. W.M. Simpson, Fort Frances to Archibald. 6 July 
1871. 
^^‘Daugherty, "Research Report", 7. 
152 Ibid., 18. 
^PAM Lieutenant-Governor’s Collection 1869-1872. W.M. Simpson, Fort Frances, to 
Archibald, 6 July 1871. 
‘^^On April 28, 1885 while a Member of Parliament, Simon Dawson wrote to 
Hayter Reed, the Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, describing the actual 
Treaty Three negotiations. He wrote in part: "I was one of the Commissioners appointed by 
the Government to negotiate a Treaty with the Salteaux tribe of Ojibbeway (sic) Indians, and 
as such was associated with Mr. W. M. Simpson in 1872, and subsequently acted in the same 
capacity with Lieutenant-Governor Morris and Mr. Provencher in 1873. The treaty was 
practically completed by myself and Mr. Simpson in 1872, and it was the draft we then made 
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actual negotiations in the fall of 1873 and based it on this earlier tentative agreement.After 
the early departure of the Saulteaux, new talks did not resume until the following year. The 
estimated total cost of all the Saulteaux demands did not exceed $125,000, a mere fraction of 
the total value of the natural resources of the region had the agreement been ratified.The 
treaty-making process, however, did not stop with this initial set-back. Simpson quickly turned 
his attention to other First Nations nearer Fort Garry. Simpson enjoyed better luck closer 
in Manitoba. There, he quickly negotiated Treaties One and Two with the Cree and Chippewa 
within months of one another.^* His success was in no small part due to the presence of the 
Archibald and McKay. Although Simpson and Archibald were frequently at odds with each 
other during the Treaty One negotiations, the participation of the Queen’s representative made 
a strong impression on the Amerindians.Treaty One was signed between the Canadian 
that was finally adopted and signed at the North West Angle of the Lake of the Woods in 
1873. The conclusion of the Treaty in 1872 was prevented by a sudden outbreak of measles 
among the Indians, which led them to disperse before it was signed. ” 
'^^C. Ratkoff-Rojnoff. ”The Nolin - Paypom Treaty and Wild Rice" Ottawa: Treaty 
and Historical Research. Department of Indians Affairs. 1980., 28. 
‘“Morris, Treaties of Canada. 48. 
‘^^PAM Archibald Collection. Proclamation to Indians of Manitoba Meet at lower 
Fort Garry for the Purpose of Negotiating a Treaty. 18 July 1871. 
‘“Treaty One was signed between the Canadian government and the Chippewa and 
the Swampy Cree on August 31, 1871 and Treaty Two was concluded with the CWppewa at 
Manitoba Post on August 21, 1871. 
‘^’Hall, "A Serene Atmosphere?: Treaty One Revisited." 
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government and the Chippewa and the Swampy Cree on 31 August 1871 and Treaty Two was 
concluded with the Chippewa at Manitoba Post on 21 August 1871. With Treaties One and Two 
completed, the Dominion government grew more anxious to establish a formal relationship with 
the Saulteaux and complete the transfer of Aboriginal land title in Manitoba and what is now 
Northwestern Ontario. Simpson tried once again to reach an agreement with the Saulteaux in 
June of the following year but was unsuccessful. He complained that it was difficult to reach 
a consensus among the Saulteaux when so many arrived for the negotiations. Nevertheless, by 
1872, the Saulteaux were growing impatient with the government’s inflexibility to such an extent 
that Simpson became concerned for the safety of Canadians residing in Saulteaux country. He 
requested that a military force be sent to Fort Frances to protect Canada’s interest in the 
region.^* Simpson made one final to reach an agreement with the Saulteaux in October in Fort 
William. By then, the government had authorized him to offer better annuities and higher wages 
for the chiefs and headmen. Unfortunately, the meeting was planned too late in the year and few 
arrived in Fort William to discuss the offer. Clearly, the Canadian government was slowly 
coming to realize that it needed to show some flexibility with the Saulteaux if it wanted to reach 
an agreement with them. 
Canadian officials expected the Saulteaux to sign a treaty similar to the ones already 
negotiated with the Cree. When they did not do so, the government dismissed the Saulteaux 
demands as "unreasonableThe Saulteaux, for their part, w^ere prepared to wait and watch 
‘®NAC, RG 10, Red Series, Department of Indian Affairs, volume 1868, file 377, 
Commissioner Simpson to Secretary of State Howe, 17 July 1872. 
'‘^'Ibid. 
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to see whether the Canadian government was prepared to honour the promises made to the 
Amerindian signatories of Treaties One and Two. It was becoming apparent to Dawson that the 
Canadian government would have to show some flexibility and "make these men more liberal 
offers than they were able to do last year."‘“ 
It was obvious that, even though many of the Saulteaux leaders wished to establish a 
formal relationship with the Canadian government through a treaty, they refused to negotiate 
away title to their land. What the government failed to appreciate was that the Saulteaux wanted 
to negotiate with a representative of the Crown, not someone who they regarded merely as a 
pedlar, fiir trader or Indian agent at the very best. They wanted someone with authority they 
could trust. The two parties remained at a stalemate Alexander Morris was appointed to the post 
of Lieutenant-Governor of Manitoba and the North West Territories in 1873. 
‘®^AC, RGIO, volume 1873, file 377. Memorandum in Reference to the Indians on 
the Red River Route, Simon Dawson to the Honourable H.L. Langevin, Minister of Public 
Works, 2 June 1873. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE ARRIVAL OF MORRIS 
It is difficult to assess the achievement of Alexander Morris, chief negotiator for the 
Canadian government in the talks with the Saulteaux that led to Treaty Three. In spite of 
being in poor health, he was a man of considerable administrative talent and vision. He 
governed as best he could in a manner fair to all its varied interests avoiding, whenever 
possible, the call-out of the military. Not surprisingly, in terms of Treaty Three, he has been 
praised for signing an agreement with the Saulteaux where others had failed for four years. 
Certainly, Morris was a skilled negotiator and a conciliator while a Member of Parliament 
and of John A. Macdonald’s government. In fact, his role in the negotiations between 
Macdonald and George Brown led to the Great Coalition, which was instrumental in the 
movement to Confederation. Yet, the word "conciliator" hardly comes to mind when one 
reads Morris’ own account of the Treaty Three negotiations. During those talks, he refused 
to entertain any changes to the location of their meeting and steadfastly stuck to his own 
agenda.His reputation for achievement is certainly reinforced by the fact that one of the 
few easily accessible sources on the negotiations is his book. The Treaties of Canada with the 
Indians.Nevertheless, a close evaluation of the events unfolding in Manitoba and the 
North-West Territories in 1873 indicates otherwise. A reassessment of Morris’ achievement 
may be in order in light of the events unfolding in Manitoba and the North-West Territories 
^®Jean Friesen, "Alexander Morris" Dictionary of Canadian Biolography (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1982); vol. 11, 608-15. 
Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North- 
West Territories including Negotiations on which they Were Based (Toronto, 1880,; reprinted 
Toronto: Coles Publishing Company, 1971), 15. 
‘“Ibid. 
in 1873. 
Morris was at first reluctant to accept the appointment of Lieutenant-Governor of 
Manitoba and the North-West Territories. He turned down several offers of the appointment 
from John A. Macdonald before finally agreeing to accept the responsibility in 1872. The 
prime minister originally appointed Morris, his close friend and confidante, to the post of 
magistrate in Manitoba following an illness that led to his resignation from cabinet. 
Macdonald was anxious to have a Lieutenant-Governor in Manitoba who he could trust and 
saw such a man in Morris. 
The prime minister had a long association with Morris that dated back to the former’s 
youth. Morris had proven himself effective in the backrooms and Macdonald learned to 
count on him during political crises. It is not surprising that Macdonald believed Morris to 
be the ideal candidate to solve the growing problems of Manitoba and the North-West 
Territories. Morris was no more pleased than Archibald with his Manitoba appointment. 
Pressure mounted from both Archibald and the prime minister on Morris to accept the post of 
Lieutenant-Governor almost as soon as he arrived in Fort Garry. Morris repeatedly turned 
the appointment down until 1872 when he finally accepted the post. At it was, Morris found 
his hands full as magistrate. Once in Fort Garry, he found himself mired in the racial and 
sectarian politics of Manitoba and the North-West Territories. One of his first duties was to 
^“The role of Lieutenant-Governor in the 1870’s, particularly in Manitoba, was far the 
the ceremonial head that it is today. The Lieutenant-Governor was the Dominion 
government’s representative and "agent” in the provincial capital. He was expected to act in 
the best interests of the Dominion not the province. It was therefore important for the prime 
minister of Canada to trust the man who he appointed to this post. See also, John T. 
Saywell, The Office of Lieutenant-Governor: A Study in Canadian Government and Politics 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957), 22. 
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confirm the accuracy of the census taken in 1871; there were charges that Metis were being 
denied their rights as citizens as a result of the census undertaken by Adams Archibald after 
he had arrived in Manitoba. 
Once in the Lieutenant-Governor’s office, Morris had a number of serious issues to 
deal with including the hay privilege dispute, American whiskey traders and the Cypress Hills 
Massacre, the arrival across the border of Sioux refugees fleeing the United States Cavalry, 
and Amerindians determined to protect their way of life in the face of impatient settlers 
flooding into Manitoba in search of land. There was also the ever-present tension between 
Protestant Orangemen, originally from Ontario, and Metis, largely Catholics, who were 
descendants of marriages between Hudson’s Bay and Northwest Company employees and 
Amerindians. It is not surprising that Morris saw his supreme achievement during his term 
as Lieutenant-Governor to be, not his role in negotiating many of the numbered treaties 
although he wrote about them, but rather the establishment of responsible government in the province. 
Treaty negotiations with the Saulteaux were, in fact, far from Morris’s mind when he 
accepted the post of Lieutenant-Governor.^®’ The political environment in Manitoba had 
grown far more dangerous since the Red River Resistance, and this made Morris’s presence 
at Fort Garry even more important. Protestant Orangemen were demanding compensation for 
wrongfiil imprisonment and loss of property during the "insurrection" while Metis leaders 
were demanding amnesty for themselves and Louis Riel. Competition for land was 
increasing the tension between the Amerindians and white settlers in Manitoba as agricultural 
'®’There is hardly a reference to treaty negotiations in either set of the Morris Papers 
found at the Manitoba Archives until he began serious preparation for talks in the spring of 
1873. 
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development began to displace the traditional way of life of the Metis and other Aboriginal 
peoples.* The growing number of Sioux refugees in Manitoba was increasing the likelihood 
that blood would be spilled as their leaders threatened war if land allotments were not 
provided by the federal government. The Sioux seemed little concerned that the Canadian 
government considered them the responsibility of the American government. The Sioux had, 
in fact, hunted bison in the region before any Red River settlers arrived in the region. They 
had also carried on an active trade with the "Canadian" Metis for weapons and ammunition 
before Dominion authorities established a pressence in Manitoba. The border meant little 
to Sitting Bull and his followers except as an invisible wall which the "Long Knives" were 
afraid to cross. 
In this troubled context, Alexander Morris reopened negotiations with the Saulteaux 
that eventually led to the signing of Treaty Three. Even before he was officially 
commissioned Lieutenant-Governor of Manitoba and the Northwest Territories in 1872 and 
could begin treaty talks with the Saulteaux, Morris was forced to deal with a number of 
serious issues. Virtually all of them involved land. The fair distribution of land among the 
various ethnic groups was one of the major issues that Morris had to deal with as the 
Lieutenant-Governor of Manitoba. He pleaded with the Canadian government to grant land 
to the Metis in order to avoid a further uprising.^® Surveyors apparently had not allocated 
enough land for the Metis. The situation was compounded by the fact that some Metis had 
^“Robert M. Utley, The Lance and the Shield: The Life and Times of Sitting Bull (New 
York: Henry Holt and Company, 1993), 64 and 195. 
*®PAM, Morris Collection. 1872-1877. No 680: M.No. 103: No. 1415. Morris to 
Mcdonald (Draft telegram, cypher and translation). 
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not been included in the 1871 census. Confusion reigned as some Metis families were 
counted as Indians and others were not. Those considered Indians were eligible for annuities 
and other treaty rights, but were not included in a census that only counted ’’citizens". 
Without citizenship, these people were excluded from receiving land allotments. On the 
other hand, those who were listed as Metis were included in the census and received land as 
citizens. It remains unclear whether the Metis understood the implications of their status 
when Adams Archibald offered them the choice during the Treaty One talks. Nevertheless, 
the Canadian government was firm that families not included in the census were ineligible for 
a land allotment. The Metis leaders now demanded that the new Lieutenant-Governor 
personally add those families to the census. The Canadian government claimed, however, 
that those Metis not included on the census had made their choice to be recorded as Indians, 
had received annuities, and had forfeited any right to a land allotment. Meetings across 
the province and throughout the territory were called by Metis leaders to address the 
situation.*^’ 
The hay privilege, too, was a source of conflict between the Metis and the Canadian 
government. According to the Metis, Archibald had, during his term as Manitoba 
Lieutenant-Governor, promised them that they would be compensated for loss of their right to 
'^®Morris Collection. N. 16: M.No. 2: No. 2. Aikins to Morris 7 January 1873. 
'^Tbid., No. 1: M.No.l: No. 1436. J.S. Dennis, Survey Office, Winnipeg, to 
Morris. 3 January 1873. 
‘"%id. 
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cut hay on the commons.Without proper compensation, the Metis farmers were claiming 
the right to cut hay on tracts of land now occupied by white settlers. The Metis argued that 
they did not need the permission of the new owners to cut hay because prior to the founding 
of the Red River Colony under Lord Selldrk that land was held in common. The 
government eventually ordered Morris to appoint a local board to deal with the issue.It 
was to enquire into the problem, assess the value of the land and report confidentially on the 
potential costs of compensation to the parties involved. It was also charged to examine the 
land claims in the region. Metis land allotments were to be withheld until a setdement 
had been reached on the hay privilege issue.Morris was convinced that only the 
Canadian government could avert a crisis over this issue in Manitoba.Nevertheless, 
Morris set aside lands for the Metis pending the findings of the Commission. In spite of the 
’”Ibid., No. 50: M.No. 10. Aikins to Morris (Telegram) 25 January 1873. 
‘^^Ibid., No. 337: M.No. 56: No. 217 Meredith to Morris (Telegram) 22 July 1873. 
”’Ibid., No. 26: M.No. 3: No. 1050. Aikins to Morris. 13 January 1873. 
‘^®Ibid., No. 39: M.No. 5: No. 20 Howe to Morris. 
^^Ibid., N. 65: M.No. 17: No.25 Morris to Aikins (Draft Telegram) 11 February 
1873. 
‘^*Ibid., No. 42: M.No. 8: No. 1121 Aikins to Dennis 21 January 1873. 
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moratorium, lots were being drawn for Metis land allotments at Portage la Prairie.Metis 
allotments, unfortunately, spilled over into the Indian reserves as well as the established white 
settlements.^*® Morris, himself, favoured giving each Metis, man, woman, and child, 140 
acres. In order that speculators could not cheat the Metis out of their land, he advised the 
Canadian government to disallow any act passed by the Manitoba legislature regarding the 
sale or seizure of Aboriginal lands to whites. 
In spite of its continuing reluctance to provide Metis families not counted on the 1871 
census with land allotments in Manitoba, the Canadian government made public an order-in- 
council that granted 80 acres of farm land to each Sioux family in Manitoba. White 
settlers were concerned about the growing number of Sioux refugees coming to Manitoba, 
especially those at Poplar Point, High Bluff, and Portage la Prairie. The whites resented the 
"defiant attitude" of the Dakota in particular which they saw as a marked contrast to the 
friendliness of the Cree. John Norquay, a community leader in High Bluff and the future 
premier of Manitoba, wrote to Morris demanding that action be taken against the Sioux 
‘^Ibid., No. 80: M.No. 23: No. 46 Morris to Aikins (Draft Telegram) 22 February 
1873. 
‘®Ibid., No. 93: M.No.26: No. 20. Morris to McMicken 24 February 1873. 
^“Ibid., No. 67: M.No 18: No. 36 Campbell to Morris (Telegram) 12 February 
1873. 
*“PAM Morris Collection. N. 16: M.No. 2: No.2 Howe to Morris 8 January 1873. 
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refugees who were occupying land rich in timber, which many whites clearly wanted.'*^ 
Like the Metis, the Amerindians indigenous to Manitoba were concerned about their 
future in the territory. Many feared that their rights would not be respected by the Canadian 
authorities.^*^ They were particularly concerned about whites who were cutting timber on 
Indian reserves without first obtaining the consent of the Chiefs.By January 1873, the 
federal government had announced regulations for the cutting of timber and fuel by all parties 
in Manitoba.The Indians were concerned that they would have to share their land with 
the Metis.Indians were also concerned about the government’s immigration policy for 
the region. Morris had already set aside sizable tracts of farm land for the arrival of 
European settlers expected in the spring. Canadians, too, who had emigrated to the United 
States in search of better opportunities, were expressing interest in returning to Canada if the 
land grants were offered to them in Manitoba.'** Americans, also, were requesting 
'*^Ibid., No 422: No 1128 Letter from J. Norquay, Winnipeg, to Morris. 8 January 
1873. 
'*^Ibid., (Lieutenant-Governor’s Secretary to John Constant, Chief, Devon Mission, 
Cumberland. (Dr^) 
'*^Ibid., Wemyss M. Simpson, Indian Office, Winnipeg, to Morris 9 January 1873. 
'*®Ibid., No.39: M.No.5: No.20. Howe to Morris. 20 January 1873. 
'”Ibid., No.26: M.No.3: No. 1050 Henry Prince, St. Peter’s Parish, to Morris. 
'**Ibid., No. 304: M.No. 49: No.206 John Ralston to Morris 14 June 1873. 
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information from Morris on the availability of good farm land in Manitoba, as hundreds 
expressed an interest in immigrating to Manitoba/*^ Indians who had not yet signed treaties 
with the Canadian government feared a flood of settlers and were anxious to open 
negotiations. They told Morris that Archibald had promised them treaties shortly before he 
left his post as Lieutenant-Governor.^®” Morris, frustrated in his attempts to ascertain "the 
truth" in Manitoba, requested confirmation from Archibald, now Lieutenant-Governor of 
Nova Scotia, if such promises had actually been made. He also urged the Canadian 
government to move quickly with its promise to survey the Indian reserves as a way of 
maintaining peaceful relations between the Amerindians and the new settlers.^®* 
Aboriginal people in Manitoba who had not yet signed treaties with the government 
were also concerned about railroad construction through their traditional homelands. In 
February, Morris received information from the Canadian government regarding future 
railroad construction across Manitoba and the North-West Territories. It was vital that peace 
be established in Manitoba so rail construction could be carried on without interruption. The 
Canadian government optimistically projected the construction of the Pacific railroad between 
^*®Ibid., No. 377: M.No. 67: No. 232 W. N. Fairbanks, Thomas Carney, 
Winnipeg, to Morris 29 July 1873. 
^®”Ibid., No. 344: M.No. 58: No. 220 Campbell to Morris (telegram) 10 July 1873. 
^®%id., No. 93: M.No. 26: No. 20 Morris to Macdonald 24 February 1873. 
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Lake Superior and Red River to be completed by 1876.^^^ There was a concern that unless 
Manitoba was connected to Eastern Canada by rail, local interests would seek to link the Red 
River settlement with Minnesota.^” The Canadian government thus grew concerned about 
maintaining law and order in Manitoba. In addition to discussing the possibility of a new 
police force, the government began drafting legislation to prevent the sale of Indian land 
allotments to speculators. Morris was concerned that the policy initiative did not adequately 
protect the Aboriginal peoples from unscrupulous speculators.^®^ He suggested amendments 
that the government promised to consider. Ironically, by March 1873, the Indians were 
acting upon the advice of Wemyss Simpson, Indian Commissioner and chief negotiator of 
Treaties One and Two, to sell their land to white settlers in St. Peter’s Parish. 
In addition to these land problems, Morris had a number of other serious issues to 
deal with before he could initiate negotiations with the Saulteaux along the Dawson Road. 
By March a number of issues needed his immediate attention. Riel was rallying support for a 
by-election bid in the riding of Provencher.^®’ Tension was also increasing as a result of the 
claim by leaders of the Resistance that an amnesty had been offered to them by the former 
‘®%id.. No. 80: M.No. 23: No. 46. Mcdonald to Morris (Telegram) 17 February 
1873. 
‘®%id., No. 40: M.No. 6: No. 1153 Howe to Morris 20 January 1873. 
^®^Ibid., No. 65: M.No. 17: No. 25 Morris to Mcdonald (Draft Telegram) 10 
February 1873. 
’®%id.. No. 93: M.No. 26: No.20 (Private, French) Joseph Royal to Morris March 
1873. 
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lieutenant-governor in the presence of Sir George-Etienne Cartier himself/^ In addition to 
the demands of Riel and his followers, Morris received reports that Sioux refugees under the 
leadership of Sitting Bull, in spite of the federal offer of land elsewhere, were gathering at 
White Mud River. Hudson’s Bay Company officials in the area feared the worse and called 
upon Morris to send troops to protect the lives and property of Amerindians and settlers in 
the area. There were unconfirmed reports of Sioux warriors engaging in looting at Egg 
Lake. Rumours spread that Sioux led by Little Knife were planning raids throughout 
Manitoba in the spring.^®’ 
Morris took these reports seriously and sent a telegram to Ottawa to inform the 
government of the danger of a Sioux uprising in Manitoba. As a solution, he requested 
permission to negotiate a formal treaty with them. Lacking a sufficient number of troops and 
militia, Morris dispatched couriers to seek assistance from the Cree and the Assiniboine and 
prepared defensive measures against the Sioux as best he could. Meanwhile, settlers at 
High Bluff requested permission to form a volunteer militia company to defend against 
potential Sioux attacks.Bloodshed was avoided, however, when Morris received 
permission to negotiate a treaty with the Sioux in the spring. He immediately commissioned 
'’^Ibid., No. 115: M.No, 27: no. 27 Morris to Mcdonald. 3 March 1873. 
^®^Ibid., No. 127: M.No. 30: No. 81 John Norquay, Winnipeg to Morris. 17 March 
1873. 
‘”Ibid., No. 151: M.No. 32: No. 99 Morris to Howe, 21 March 1873. 
^^%id., Urquhart to Rev. Brown, High Bluff, 22 March 1873. 
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Pascal Breland, a former HBC employee who had had extensive experience with 
Amerindians, to talk with the Sioux. Breland found the leaders of the Sioux to be amiable 
and reported to Morris that rumours of spring attacks were greatly exaggerated. 
Nevertheless, he was concerned that Fort Ellice was in real danger of attack and advised 
Morris to order that reinforcements be sent there.^ He also reported that the Sioux had 
agreed to send representatives to talk with Morris in the spring. 
In spite of these friendly talks with the Sioux, fear of Sioux raids against Fort Garry 
grew. The Cypress Hills, where at least six American liquor trading posts operated, 
continued to be a centre of trouble for Sioux and other Amerindian people in the region.^“ 
A massacre of Assiniboines there, by American liquor traders from Montana was an 
important test for the Canadian government as Amerindians watched and waited to see if they 
could expect justice from the Canadian government. No sooner than news of the Cypress 
Hills Massacre spread through Manitoba than there were reports, that both Sitting Bull and 
Little Knife had been poisoned. This precipitated further reports of reprisals and other 
"massacres" White settlers called for the removal of ail of the Sioux to reserves and the 
“°Ibid., Breland, Lac Qu’Appelle, to McKeaghey, Administrator. 9 April 1873. 
“Tbid., Pascal Breland, Prairie du Cheval Blanc, to Morris, 22 March 1873. 
^Ibid., Archibald McDonald, Fort Ellice, to McKeagney. 16 April 1873. 
“^PAM Morris Collection. No. 205: M.No. 39: No. 132 Archibald McDonald, Fort 
Ellice, to McKeagney, 16 April 1873. 
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volunteer militia continued to prepare defensive positions at High Bluff. By the end of 
April, the Sioux question was in the hands of Macdonald.^ By May, military officials 
believed the crisis had subsided but Colonel Osborne Smith (1831-1887), the Deputy Adjutant 
General of Manitoba and the North-West Territories since 1872, recommended to Morris that 
he seek authority to disarm Sioux refugees before they entered the country.^ A company 
of infantry soldiers was also ordered to reinforce Fort Ellice against the threat of a Sioux 
uprising.”^ By June, Morris was able to inform the prime minister that negotiations with 
the Sioux had been successful and arrangements had been made to settle them on a 
reserve.^* 
In addition to these Amerindian problems, Morris had to deal with the preliminaiy 
recommendations of the commission looking into the hay privilege. The commissioners 
concluded in their final report that the land issue was too complex for a blanket policy. 
Instead, they recommended that a new board be set up to investigate each claim and offer 
^Ibid., No. 151: M.No. 32: No. 99 Address from the People of High Bluff to 
Morris. 17 April 1873. 
^Ibid., No. 205: M.No. 39: No. 132 McKeagnney to Macdonald. 22 April 1873. 
^Ibid., No. 205: M.No. 39: No. 132 W. Osborne Smith, Fort Garry to Morris 1 
May 1873. 
^Ibid., Orderly Officer, Deputy Adjutant General Dominion Troops, Fort Garry, to 
Urquhart 1 May 1873. 
^Ibid., No. 270: N.No. 46: No. 186 Morris to Macdonald (Draft telegram) 6 June 
1873. 
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suitable compensatioii on an individual basis to Metis and white alike.^ Rumours that a 
decision was pending increased expectations. Far from resolving the issue, unofficial reports 
of the board’s recommendations increased tensions in Manitoba. Morris agreed with the 
commission’s findings and recommended that the Canadian government intervene and offer 
an even more flexible package to the Metis in way of compensation.^^® Instead, the 
government instructed Morris to carry out the recommendations of the board quietly without 
making the final report public.^" Morris had hoped to check the support of Riel in the 
Metis community prior to the Provencher by-election by settling the hay privilege issue but 
the actions of the Canadian government made this quite unlikely. 
To make matters worse, American liquor traders and Metis agitators were making the 
region near the Canadian / American border ungovernable. Tension in the Aboriginal 
community was increasing. Meanwhile, the Saulteaux and Cree had formed an alliance 
against the Sioux who were infringing upon their collective hunting grounds. For their part, 
the Metis were spreading rumours in the Aboriginal community that white settlers were 
planning genocide in Manitoba. Riel also remained tremendously popular among the Metis 
who occupied the border areas and ofiicials in Fort Garry were concerned that, if Riel gave 
“®Ibid., No. 115: M.No.27: no. 71. Report on Rights of Common and Rights of 
Cutting Hay by James C. McKeagney, L. Betoumay and J.S. Dennis. 6 March 1873. 
^^®Ibid., No. 277: M.No. 47: No. 188 Morris to Macdonald 29 May 1873. 
^"Ibid., No. 1115 Aikins to Morris 15 June 1873. 
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the signal, the entire region could erupt into rebellion.^^^ Tension intensified as American 
Metis promised support for a rebellion against British rule in Manitoba and the North West 
Territories. Canadian officials feared the appearance of Riel at Fort Qu’Appelle would ignite 
the powder keg.^^^ 
By June, it was becoming clear to Morris that he was powerless to stop the election of 
Riel. He called upon the Canadian government to respond to the growing tension between 
Metis and white settlers in Manitoba caused by the Provencher by-election.Morris began 
preparations to arrest Riel for inspiring insurrection.^*^ The Lieutenant-Governor attempted 
to seize the initiative by confronting Metis leaders publicly on their charges against the 
Canadian government and asserted that the Crown had ultimate legal authority to govern 
throughout the North West Territories. He also denied their charges that the Metis had been 
treated unfairly as a result of the Red River Resistance.^**^ 
Growing tension among the Sioux, the Metis, and the "Canadian" Aboriginal peoples 
^*%id.. No. 151: M.No. 32: No.99 Breland, White Horse Plains, to Morris. 18 
May 1873. 
^*^Ibid., No. 151: M.No. 32: No.99. Urquhartto McKeagney, 29 May 1873. 
"*"Ibid., No. 270: N.No. 46: No. 186 Morris to Macdonald June 1873. 
^*^Ibid., No. 270: N.No. 46: No. 186 Morris to John Fisher and other, Qu’Appelle 
4 June 1873. 
^*®Ibid., No. 270: N.No. 46: No. 186 John Fisher and others, Qu’Appelle to Morris 
4 June 1873. 
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led to renewed calls by white settlers for the removal of all Amerindians to reserves. 
Morris was asked to advise on a federal proposal to create a commission to oversee Indian 
affairs in Manitoba. The board would include the Lieutenant-Governor, the Land Officer, 
the Indian Commissioner, and representatives of the Manitoba legislature as well as Metis 
leaders.Morris was concerned about the position of the Indian Commissioner within the 
structure of the Manitoba governmentJ.A.N. Provencher had been appointed to chair 
the new Board of Commissioners for Indian Affairs of the Northwest Territories, but it was 
unclear whether he would receive his instructions directly from the Canadian government or 
from Morris. 
The Canadian government clearly had more reason to negotiate treaties with 
Amerindians w’est of Fort Garry than the Saulteaux of Rainy River and the Lake of the 
Woods. Morris was pleased to receive instructions from the government to open negotiations 
with the Amerindians west of Fort Ellice that June.“^ As preparations began for spring 
^^’Ibid., No. 151: M.No. 32: No.99. F. Ruddlestone, Portage la Prairie, to 
McKeagney 30 April 1873. 
^**Ibid., No. 270: N.No. 46: No. 186 Campbell to Morris. 10 June 1873. 
^^’Ibid., No. 313: M.No. 52: No. 212 Morris to Macdonald 20 June 1873. 
“°Ibid., Spragge to Morris 25 June 1873. 
“Tbid., No. 313: M.No. 52: No. 212 W. Spragge, Indians Affairs, Ottawa, to 
Morris 24 June 1873. 
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talks with the Amerindians, reports of Metis attacks against white settlers reached Fort 
Garry.222 jjjg Mennonite community called on Morris to send troops to protect their 
families and homes near White Horse Plains. Morris responded quickly by calling out troops 
and sending agents into the region.^ Colonel Osborne Smith was ordered to put down the 
disturbance and to arrest any suspected ring leaders. Five men were taken into custody.^ 
News of the arrests arrived at the same time that American authorities were providing 
information to Morris on whisky' traders operating illegally along the border. Minnesota 
officials provided Morris with intelligence on liquor trading as well as the names of American 
and Metis offenders.^ The reason for the sudden U.S. cooperation remains unclear, but it 
is possible that American authorities were growing embarrassed by the antics of its nationals 
in the province of Manitoba. The Americans may also have sought information on Sioux 
activities in Canada and hoped for speedy extradition of the Sioux leaders if warrants were 
issued south of the border. 
As Canadian - American relations inp^oved, the Canadian government changed its 
treaty-making strategy. After Archibald claimed not to have made any promises to Indians 
west of Fort Garry in regard to treaties, the government decided to postpone negotiations 
“^Ibid., No. 332: M.No. No. 216. William Hespeler, White Horse Plains, to 
Morris. 30 June 1873. 
^Ibid., Morris to Osborne Smith 1 July 1873. 
^Ibid., Osborne Smith to Morris 2 July 1873. 
“^Ibid., Walter J.S. Traill, Georgetown, Minnesota, to Morris 7 July 1873. 
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with them and turned its attention to the Saulteaux.^ Morris insisted that this was a 
mistake, as the territories west of Fort Garry had rich agricultural potential. The 
Amerindians who occupied this region feared a flood of white farmers into their hunting 
grounds and were eager to negotiate treaties.The Canadian government acted upon the 
former governor’s advice, however, and decided not to negotiate treaties with any of the 
western First Nations until the migration dictated that action was required.^ The situation 
had changed, however, since Archibald was in Manitoba. In spite of the change in federal 
policy, western chiefs and their people continued to gather near St. Peter’s parish and awaited 
what they considered to be the promised arrival of the Indian Commissioner. When the 
Canadian representative did not arrive, white settlers grew concerned for their safety.^ 
James Nisbet, (1823-1874) a Presbyterian missionary working with Amerindians in Prince 
Albert, wrote Morris to inquire why the government had not sent an Indian Commissioner to 
negotiate a treaty. Nisbet was concerned about the safety of the 40 white families who had 
“®Ibid., No. 342, M.No. 57: No. 219. Campbell to Morris (Telegram) 10 July 
1873. 
“’Ibid., No. 377: M.No. 21: No. 55. Campbell to Morris. 14 August 1873. 
“*Ibid., No. 342, M.No. 57: No. 219. Campbell to Morris 10 July 1873. 
“®Ibid., No. 324: M.No. 55: No. 188. Abraham Cowley, St. Peter’s, Lisgar, to 
Morris 23 June 1873. 
81 
settled in the Prince Albert region.^ 
As fear of an Amerindian uprising grew west of Fort Garry, violence threatened to 
erupt over the still unresolved hay privilege. The final recommendations of the commission 
still had not been released and the Metis were growing restless. To buy time, Morris issued 
a proclamation that restricted the sale of the land in question.In anticipation of the final 
recommendations being released, applications were forwarded by various people for 
permission to cut hay on the disputed land. Local officials were concerned that property 
would be destroyed and blood shed.^^ In July, the government announced its decision. 
Metis farmers would no longer have the right to cut hay on areas recently settled by whites, 
in spite of the fact that they had done this for years.The Roman Catholic Church used 
this decision to assert its influence in Manitoba. The Church had long been a vocal advocate 
of the rights of the French-speaking Metis, especially during the Red River Resistance and on 
behalf of those convicted of various crimes as a result of the rebellion. The Church now 
urged Morris to resolve the outstanding issue of land allotments for the Metis.^ 
^^id., No. 51. Memorandum of Matters to be submitted for the consideration of 
His Honour Governor Morris by James Nisbet, Presbyterian Missionary, Prince Albert 
Saskatchewan 22 July 1873. 
“%id.. No. 342, M.No. 57: No. 219. Morris to Royal 19 July 1873. 
”%id., Joseph Royal, Provincial Secretary, to Morris 20 July 1873. 
^^Ibid., No. 337: M.No. 56: No. 217 Meredish to Morris (Telegram) 22 July 1873. 
^Ibid., Bishop Tache, St. Boniface, to Morris. 22 July 1873. 
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By July, the Canadian cabinet was fully informed about the escalating violence in 
Manitoba. Government officials were reviewing reports of Metis attacks in the spring against 
the Mennonites at White Horse Plains.They were also considering their military 
commitment to the Northwest Territories in light of the growing illegal trade in alcohol by 
American whisky traders.^ There were divisions in the Manitoba administration as a 
lingering dispute between Morris and Indian Commissioner Provencher came to a head. In 
the spring of 1873, the Canadian government had informed both Morris and Provencher that 
it had delegated its authority to the Lieutenant-Governor and that he would provide the Indian 
Commissioner with instructions on the negotiation of treaties in the region. Provencher 
ignored Morris as he prepared to begin negotiations with the Saulteaux, however, and sought 
permission to begin the Treaty Three negotiations directly from Ottawa.It was no secret 
in Manitoba that Morris was not pleased with the way the Indian Commissioner was 
executing his duties. Morris blamed the growing discontent among Amerindians west of Fort 
Garry on Provencher as he had blamed Simpson for the problems of the North-West Angle. 
He favored the appointment of James McKay to the post, however, that would not be until 
after the Treaty Three negotiations.^ Provencher, for his part, believed that he was simply 
^^Ibid., No. 364; M.No. 61: No. 226 Aikins to Morris 22 July 1873. 
^Ibid., No. 366: M.No. 62: No. 227 Aikins to Morris 24 July 1873. 
^’Ibid., No. 377: M.No. 67: No. 232 Morris to J.A.N. Provencher, Indian 
Commissioner 22 July 1873. 
“*Guy R. Joubert, "A Biographical Sketch of James McKay" (Kenora: Treaty and 
Aborigine Rights Research, June 1983), 5 
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acting upon the cabinet’s instructions forwarded to him by Simon Dawson. These 
instructions came directly from Ottawa bypassing Morris entirely. To Provencher, the whole 
episode was a simple misunderstanding. 
Meanwhile, Dawson had already asked the Saulteaux to meet for treaty talks, and they 
had agreed. The Commissioner wrote to Morris telling him that the Canadian government 
placed the responsibility of preparing for the face-to-face negotiations in the hands of Dawson 
and his partyIn spite of the tension between Provencher and Morris, Dawson carried on 
with the planned negotiations. He warned the Commissioner to expect approximately 1500 
Saulteaux to attend the talks. In order to ensure on-going negotiations, Dawson requested 
that the Canadian government provide him with $10 per head to buy supplies and presents for 
the Saulteaux. He informed Morris directly of special problems that he was encountering in 
his preliminary talks with the Saulteaux. Based on his participation in earlier talks with 
them, Dawson knew that the federal government would have to modify its negotiating 
position to reach an agreement. He warned Morris that these people were fully aware of 
American concessions awarded to their relatives south of the border. The Chippewa had 
received $14 per head, not the $3 that the Canadian government had offered during the last 
round of negotiations. In addition to annual payments, the Americans had promised the 
Chippewa agricultural implements and schools. Dawson told Morris that the Saulteaux were 
skilled negotiators and would accept nothing less.^ It is hardly surprising that Dawson 
^®Ibid., No. 377: M.No. 67: No. 232 Provencher to Morris 23 July 1873. 
“°Ibid., S. J. Dawson, St. Boniface, to Morris 23 July 1873. 
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also warned that the Canadian negotiating team would need more discretionary power to 
arrive at an agreement than it had previously been given. He also believed that it was 
essential that a large body of troops accompany the Canadian representatives if this round of 
negotiations were to be successful.^* Most important of all, Dawson warned Morris that 
his presence was critical at the talks since the Saulteaux were prepared to negotiate only with 
the Queen’s representative in the area, the Lieutenant-Governor himself. Dawson believed 
that treaty talks would fail if Morris did not attend the Lake of the Woods talks in 
September."^ 
The Canadian government wanted to conclude negotiations with the Saulteaux as 
quickly as possible.Dawson had convinced the Saulteaux to meet the Canadian 
negotiators at Lake of the Woods in the fall. He reported that the strongest support for a 
treaty existed among the Saulteaux who occupied the territory along the Dawson Road.^ 
By July 29, Morris was convinced that Dawson had assessed the situation accurately. He 
concluded that his presence was necessary if the negotiations were to be successful.^* With 
a meeting agreed to for September, Morris reported to Alexander Campbell, Macdonald’s 
^*Ibid. 
^%id., S. J. Dawson, St. Boniface, to Morris 23 July 1873. 
^*Ibid., Aikins to Dawson, Thunder Bay. 21 June 1873. 
^Ibid., Dawson, Fort Garry, to Aikins. 19 July 1873. 
^*Ibid., Morris to Minister of Interior (Draft telegram and cypher) 29 July 1873. 
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closest confidant in cabinet that he, Provencher and Lindsay Russell, the Dominion Land 
Agent, would be Canada’s representatives at the treaty negotiations with the Saulteaux. 
Presents, provisions, and a military escort had been arranged. Morris planned to leave for 
Lake of the Woods following the next meeting of the North-west Council.^ 
However, another political crisis was developing that threatened to prevent his 
attendance at the treaty talks in the fall. The North-West Council voted to cancel the land 
allotments promised the Metis earlier in the year and this made Morris furious. In addition 
to these legislative problems, Russell was surveying reserves for the Sioux on the west shore 
of Lake Manitoba and had not returned in time to join the advance party leaving for the 
Saulteaux negotiations.^^ Russell had already indicated his reluctance to participate in 
direct negotiations with Amerindians in any case because he believed that treaty-making put 
him in a conflict of interest with respect to his duties as Land Agent. ^ With or without 
Russell, Morris still had to deal with the North West Council. It was to deliberate again in 
the first week of September at precisely the same time that Dawson had arranged for the 
Indian Commissioners to meet with the Saulteaux.^*’ The land allotment crisis was forcing 
Morris to choose. If he failed to attend the meeting of the North-West Council, the promised 
^Ibid., Campbell to Morris. 1 August 1873. 
"’Ibid., Campbell to Morris, (telegram) 5 August 1873. 
"*Ibid., Morris to Minister of Interior. Campbell to Morris, 1 August 1873. 
"®Ibid., Morris to Minister of Interior. 8 August 1873. 
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land allotments would certainly not be guaranteed and more unrest would develop in the 
Metis community. If he did not travel to Lake of the Woods, however, the negotiations with 
the Saulteaux would surely break down as they had done in the past.“° Morris decided that 
the negotiations should take place at Fort Frances and sent word that he required Dawson and 
Pither to be in attendance.The meeting of the North West Council would be 
posqxDned.^^ Morris prepared a letter to Ottawa outlining his concerns with regard to the 
actions of the Council on the Metis land allotments. He reminded Ottawa that the Manitoba 
Act had guaranteed the Metis right to land. He warned of more unrest if the white settlers, 
through the North-West Council, deprived the Metis of their portion of Manitoba. He 
suggested that the entire issue could be solved by offering both the Metis and Selkirk settlers 
scrip.With the North-West Council temporarily in check, Morris learned that it was 
too late to move the negotiations from the Lake of the Woods to Fort Frances.^ In 
addition, Russell arrived back to Fort Garry and told Morris that he would only provide 
professional advice to the other Indian commissioners and would not participate in the treaty- 
""Ibid. 
“'Ibid. 
“^Ibid. Campbell to Morris, (telegram) 11 August 1873. 
“%id.. No. 377: M.No. 69 Morris to Minister of Interior 13 August 1873. 
“*Ibid., No. 377: M.No. 67: No. 102. Morris to Minister of Interior. Campbell to 
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making discussions.Morris needed negotiators at the Lake of the Woods not advisors so 
he considered the possibility of appointing Dawson in place of Russell. The Canadian 
cabinet, however, did not share Morris’ enthusiasm for Dawson. Alexander Campbell, for 
instance, haboured concerns that both Dawson and Pither were both too sympathetic to the 
Saulteaux position.^® 
By August 12, Morris had received his negotiating instructions from the federal 
govemment.^^ The American government had recently concluded treaties with more 
generous presents and annuities that he could offer to the Saulteaux.^* Campbell urged 
Morris to seek press cabinet directly for more flexible negotiating terms.^’ Meanwhile, the 
final date for negotiations had been set. The Dominion delegation and the Saulteaux agreed 
to meet at the North West Angle on September 11.^ Campbell had not convinced Morris 
that the assistance of Dawson and Pither was not necessary to complete the negotiations of 
“^Ibid., No. 377: M.No. 67: No. 102. Morris to Minister of Interior. Campbell to 
Morris, 11 August 1873. 
^Ibid., 377: M.No. 67: No. 102. Campbell to Morris, (telegram) 11 August 1873. 
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1873. 
“*Ibid., No. 377: M.No. 16: No. 50. Campbell to Morris 13 August 1873. 
^%id.. No. 377: M.No. 16: No. 50. Campbell to Morris 13 August 1873. 
“°Ibid., No. 377: M.No. 21: No. 50. Campbell to Morris. 14 August 1873. 
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Treaty Three and Morris issued instructions to each requesting their attendance at the North 
West Angle. 
Even as Morris was preparing to depart for Lake of the Woods, pressure continued to 
rise from the white community to negotiate a treaty with the Amerindians west of Fort Garry. 
Whites feared an uprising, following the decision of the federal government not to open 
treaty negotiations in the spring. There were numerous reports that Amerindians were facing 
starvation on the prairies as farmers, few as there were at that time, settled unceded 
territories recently used as hunting grounds. Morris blamed much of the problem on 
Provencher’s cavalier attitude about the western Amerindian concerns and Archibald, who he 
believed had promised them that white settlers would not occupy their territory until treaties 
were signed.“^ The Sioux were also putting pressure on Morris to honour his promise to 
settle them on reserves within Canadian jurisdiction. There was growing opposition from 
white settlers, as well as Metis and other Aboriginal communities in Manitoba, to what 
seemed as too generous an offer of land to the Sioux. Morris was forced to delegate the 
responsibility of settling the Sioux problem to his subordinates.Tensions subsided when 
the federal government approved of his recommendations to set aside territory near Portage la 
Prairie for the Sioux and to provide them with agricultural tools.“^ 
In addition to the deterioration of relations between the settlers and the Amerindians, 
“%id., No. 377: M.No. 21: No. 50. Morris to Campbell. 18 August 1873. 
“^bid., No. 23: No. 56. Campbell to Morris. 18 August 1873. 
“^Ibid., No. 3: No. 64 Meredith to Morris. 22 August 1873. 
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rejection of the hay privilege continued to fester. The Canadian government had decided not 
to maintain the hay privilege, and it now had to determine fair compensation for this loss of 
the commons. Russell determined how much land the Metis would require as compensation 
shortly before Morris departed for the North West Angle negotiations.^ Russell wrote 
Morris that his land surveys indicated that the Metis had already received more land than they 
were entitled to receive as a result of the census. Morris knew that this revelation would not 
please the Metis.^ 
With the Sioux danger temporarily averted but the hay privilege still simmering, 
Morris turned his attention to the western tribes. Not only was he concerned about the threat 
of an uprising in the west but both Catholic and Protestant leaders in Manitoba were putting 
intense pressure on the Canadian government to negotiate treaties with the Amerindians. 
Church leaders throughout the North-West Territories wanted treaties to encompass a number 
of issues that the government was reluctant to concede. The various denominations wanted 
the federal government to provide funding for Native education, fair land allotments for the 
Metis, and employment opportunities for all the Amerindians in Manitoba.^ The Canadian 
government now informed Morris that he could promise the western tribes that treaty 
negotiations would begin the following spring. He should send Provencher with this message 
“^Ibid., No. 368 Lindsay Russell, Selkirk, to Morris. 18 August 1873. 
^Ibid., No. 396. Lindsay Russell, Selkirk, to Morris. 19 August 1873. 
^Ibid., No. 27: No. 58. Campbell to Morris. 20 August 1873. 
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to the Amerindians following the Treaty Three negotiations.Morris’ confidence in 
Provencher continued to wane, however as the Indian Commissioner failed to accompany 
Russell on his trip to show the Sioux the location of their new reserves.^ 
As Morris prepared to leave for the Treaty Three talks, he was concerned about the 
size of his military escort. As Dawson had suggested, Morris wanted a large escort to 
impress the Saulteaux with the strength and determination of the Canadian government. His 
military advisors remained concerned about the Sioux, the Metis, the rest of the Amerindians 
in the west. Each group posed a serious threat to the stability of the Manitoba government in 
1873. The army wanted Morris to take only 55 infantry soldiers and three officers for his 
trip to the Lake of the Woods.“^ Morris insisted on more. He wanted at least 70 
soldiers.^® However, by the time his party left for the Lake of Woods, disturbances in 
what is now Saskatchewan demanded that many of the soldiers be transferred west instead. 
Clearly, various issues required the attention of Morris at Fort Garry. The 
disappointment of the Amerindians in the west, the fear that the North West Council would 
cancel the land allotments for the Metis, growing tension arising from the Sioux pressence, 
and illegal liquor trading by Americans created a difficult political environment in Manitoba. 
^Ibid., No. 35: No. 67. Meredith to Morris. 22 August 1873. 
“*Ibid., No. 416. Lindsay Russell, Selkirk, to Morris. 24 August 1873. 
^Ibid., No. 39: No. 50. Campbell to Morris. 28 August 1873. 
^^Ibid., No. 39: No. 50. Morris to Campbell. 1 September 1873. 
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Morris knew he would have to settle the Treaty Three negotiations quickly; he did not have 
the luxury of time to deal with the Saulteaux. The growing fear in Fort Garry that Riel 
would be elected in Provencher only intensified the need to conclude the Treaty Three 
negotiations quickly.^* The Lieutenant-Governor was under intense pressure as he travelled 
to the Lake of the Woods, determined to sign an agreement with the Saulteaux. His decison 
to attend the talks was no doubt influenced by Dawson, who strongly recommended that the 
Lieutenant-Governor attend. Dawson had applied all the pressure he could to ensure that 
Morris would be there during the upcoming treaty talks with the Saulteaux. Dawson believed 
that it was crucial to their success that the Queen’s representative negotiate face-to-face with 
the Saulteaux. It becomes clear that it was not necessarily the considerable talents of Morris 
or even the wearing down of the Saulteaux, both important factors in their own right, that led 
to the signing of Treaty Three but his position as the Queen’s representative that chiefly 
accounted for his success. 
”‘Ibid., No. 393: M.No. 73: No. 250. Campbell to Morris, (telegram, cypher and 
translation) 21 August 1873. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS 
The work of the advance party undertaken by Simon J. Dawson and Robert Pither on 
one hand, and James McKay on the other, proved to be invaluable when the formal treaty 
negotiations between the Canadian Indian Commissioners and the Saulteaux began in the fall. 
Little is known about these initial talks except that the two parties agreed on a date for the 
meeting. Dawson revealed to Morris what the position of the Saulteaux was going into the 
formal negotiations, although their basic position had been available to the Canadian 
authorities since 1869^^^. The formal negotiations almost did not take place. A 
misunderstanding threatened these face-to-face negotiations before the Morris had a chance to 
meet the Saulteaux representatives. Dawson had arranged with some of the Saulteaux chiefs 
to meet at the Lake of the Woods during the second week of September but events both in 
Manitoba and at the Lake of the Woods led to delays. As it was, Morris did not arrive at the 
Lake of the Woods until September 25th.The location of the negotiations and the date 
had not been unanimously agreed to by all of the Saulteaux First Nations. Some leaders were 
pressing Morris to change the location of the meeting from the Lake of the Woods to Fort 
Frances. As Morris was preparing to depart for the North West Angle, he ordered Dawson 
to tell the Saulteaux that a change of venue was impossible considering the late date.”* The 
”^Provincial Archives of Manitoba, Morris Papers, No. 63: No. 110. Demands 
made by the Indians as their terms for a Treaty, dated Fort Frances, 22 January 1869. 
”^Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report. 1874. Lieutenant-Governor Morris to the 
Minister of the Interior, 14 October, 1874; 15. 
”*PAM Morris Collection. M.No. 82. Indian Commissioner to Indians of the 
Saulteaux Tribe, 3 September 1873. 
Saulteaux were to be told that, unless the talks were held at the Lake of the Woods, the 
negotiations would have to be posQwned until the following year.^^ 
In spite of the possibility of a breakdown, Canadian officials continued to prepare for 
the negotiations. Dawson was notified that he would replace Lindsay Russell, Land Agent 
for Manitoba, as a member of the Indian Board for the Treaty Three negotiations.^’® By 
September 5th, Morris was concerned that the negotiations would collapse because of the 
dispute over location. He postponed the meeting until the 22nd and also considered the 
possibility of delaying the negotiations until the following year.^ Less than a week later, 
Morris ordered Pither to use his influence to convince the Saulteaux chiefs to attend the 
proposed meeting on the 22nd and to report any change in their negotiating position.^* By 
the 15th, Pither reported that the chiefs had consented to the original location and would 
arrive in time to begin negotiations on the 26th. He enclosed a list of the chiefs who planned 
to attend.^’® 
Morris’ arrival at the Lake of the Woods did not signal the start of negotiations. It 
^’^Ibid. 
^’^PAM Morris Collection. No. 273. M.No. 82. Campbell to S.J. Dawson. 3 
September 1873. 
^”Ibid., No. 273. M.No. 82. Morris to Campbell. 5 September 1873. 
^®Ibid., No. 454: M.No. 89: No. 274. Urquhart to J. Pither, Indian Agent. 11 
September 1873. 
^’^id.. No. 454: M.No. 89: No. 274. Robert Pither, North West Angle, to Morris. 
14 September 1873. 
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was now his turn to wait. In spite of the delays, some of the chiefs had not yet appeared to 
begin negotiations. The other chiefs refused to begin until tall had arrived. When the 
stragglers finally appeared, the Saulteaux needed time to caucus before meeting with Morris 
and his delegation.^ Morris remained concerned about the failure of earlier attempts by 
Wemyss Simpson, the recently retired Indian Commissioner of the region, to reach an 
agreement with these people. He wanted more flexibility in coming to terms with the 
Saulteaux especially on the contentious issue of how long the they could expect to receive 
annuities from the Canada. The government preferred to offer fixed term annuities to the 
Saulteaux but was not firmly committed on the issue.^*^ Morris also wanted more 
information on what Simpson had offered the Saulteaux in his earlier attempts to negotiate a 
treaty. He needed more information on the most recent treaties negotiated by the American 
government with its Amerindians, in particular the Chippewa. He was anxious to learn what 
concessions the First Nations had won, if any, from the Americans.^ He concluded that 
earlier negotiations had broken down on the issue of protection of Saulteaux rights in the face 
of white settlement. Morris favoured educating all Amerindians as a way of Limiting 
the responsibility of the Canadian government for their future welfare. He also expressed the 
^®*Morris, Treaties of Canada. 53-55. 
^^PAM Morris Collection. No. 426: M.NNo. 81: No. 1157. Campbell to Morris, 
(telegram) 29 August 1873. 
“^Ibid., No. 444/219 MNo. 86. Campbell to Morris. 9 September 1873. 
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idea that, by providing an education for the Saulteaux, he could negotiate smaller 
annuities.^ He was also concerned about promising protection for agriculture land already 
occupied by the Saulteaux.^ The government informed him that he had the power to 
protect such farms within the boundaries of reserves, which could be held in trust, like the 
ones outlined in the Robinson Superior Treaty. These farms should not be "excessive", 
however, he was told.^ In the end, he was told to use his own discretion. The 
government did not want these treaty negotiations to fail.^*^ It is unclear whether Morris 
received all of the discretionary powers that Campbell had suggested he seek from the cabinet 
earlier in the year. Nevertheless, by the fall of 1873, signs were appearing that the 
Saulteaux, despite a bold front, were wearing down. They may have been resigned to the 
fact that the whites were coming and that they were powerless to stop their advance. On the 
other hand, despite what David McNab may believe, the Red River Metis may have 
convinced the Saulteaux that they could receive no more than what Governor Morris was 
prepared to offer them. When the final round of negotiations between the Morris and the 
Saulteaux opened, one of the first issues that they wanted to resolve was the location of the 
route that settlers would take in travelling west to the prairies. 
^Ibid., No. 426: M.No. 811: No. 1157. Morris to Campbell. 1 September 1873. 
^Ibid., No. 457/248: M.No. 91. Campbell to Morris. 20 September 1873. 
^Ibid., No. 457/248: M.No. 91. Campbell to Morris. 20 September 1873. 
“®Ibid., No. 444/219: M.No. 86. Campbell to Morris, (telegram, cypher and 
translation). 9 September 1873. 
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Morris grew confident that he could negotiate a better deal with the Saulteaux than 
Simpson had done with the Amerindians who signed Treaties One and Two. The Saulteaux 
situation, however was different. The Cree had been forced to settle for much less than the 
Saulteaux because they had a weaker bargaining position.^ The Cree did not face the 
threat of white settlement in their territory; it was already there. Although both tribes did 
considerable sabre-rattling prior to treaty negotiations, the Cree in Manitoba simply did not 
have the ability to back their threats after the Canadian government’s action in response to the 
Red River Resistance. The government feared that the Saulteaux could act on their threats 
partly because of their isolated woodland situation and partly as a result of violence by the 
Chippewa against American settlers in Minnesota. The government was concerned that 
railroad construction could be disrupted by the sustained armed resistance of the Saulteaux if 
they adopted guerrilla-style tactics along the Dawson Road. The Saulteaux had already 
proven themselves very successful in keeping prospectors and other whites off their land until 
a treaty was signed.^ The government had learned in Manitoba that military force was not 
an effective tool in exerting its will. There was no reason to believe such force would be any 
more effective along the Line of Route. At best, the government needed the support of the 
Saulteaux to exploit the rich natural resources of the region. At worst, they required that the 
Amerindians not interfere with their plans to develop it. 
^*^ayne E. Daugherty, "Treaty Research Report: Treaty One and Two" (Ottawa: 
Treaty and Historical Research Centre, Research Branch, Corporate Policy, Department of 
Indian and Northern Atfeirs, 1984), 16. 
PAC, RGIO, volume 1868, file 377, Commissioner Simpson to Secretary of 
State Howe, 17 July 1872. 
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The Saulteaux had learned much about treaty negotiations from their "cousins” across 
the border. The La Pointe Treaty between the Chippewa and the American government 
provided not only a blueprint for the Saulteaux to guide them in their own negotiations but 
also more than twenty years of experience of living under treaty terms in the U.S. that made 
the Saulteaux cautious in their dealings with the Canadian government. They did not want to 
suffer the same fate the Chippewa endured as the American government forced them to 
concentrate their numbers on smaller and smaller reservations, despite treaty promises.^ 
The Saulteauux were aware of other treaties signed between the United States government. 
The Saulteaux naturally expected that the Canadian authorities would be as generous as the 
United States had been.^^ This is not to say that the Saulteaux believed that the American 
treaties represented an ideal but saying so in the presence of Canadian Indian Commissioners 
was a popular ploy to win better concessions during treaty talks. Morris and the Canadian 
government made it a point to learn about the treaties negotiated south of the border.”^ 
By October 1st, the Saulteaux were ready to begin negotiations with the government, 
especially after Morris threaten to return to Fort Garry if such a meeting did not take 
place.^” The Saulteaux refused to discuss their terms for a treaty, however, until the 
government was prepared to address outstanding grievances arising from the construction and 
^Danziger, Chippewas of Lake Superior. 96. 
^“Daugherty, "Treaty Three Research Report", 43. 
^‘Morris, Treaties of Canada. 48. 
^Ibid., 54. 
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maintenance of the Dawson Road.^^ In spite of a small annuity paid to them in 
compensation for the construction of the Dawson Road, the Saulteaux had not formally 
agreed to give the Canadian government permission to operate steamers on any of the 
waterways within their traditional homelands nor were they being compensated for any of the 
timber that was cut to provide these ships with fuel. James McKay, whom Morris had sent 
to the region earlier to assure the Saulteaux that the steamers would pose no threat to them, 
had promised the Saulteaux that this issue would be discussed during the formal treaty talks 
with Morris. In addition, the Saulteaux were concerned that promises made by Simon 
Dawson during the construction of the road had not been kept. Dawson rejected then- 
charges by saying that the Saulteaux had been paid as labourers to cut the timber and had no 
right to expect any more compensation. Morris told the chiefs that "wood and water were 
the gift of the Great Spirit, and were made alike for the good of both the whiteman and red 
man."^ A Saulteaux chief countered Morris by saying, "this is Indian’s country, not the 
White man’s. 
Although no formal agreement concerning compensation for the Dawson Road was 
reached, the two groups moved on to discuss treaty proposals. The Saulteaux remained firm 
on the issues of annuities, land surrender, and federal assistance in making the transition from 
their mixed economy to one based primarily on agriculture. J.E. Foster has observed that the 
^^Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report. 1874. 15. 
^Morris, Treaties of Canada.. 45. 
”’Ibid. 
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Saulteeaux had two major objectives in negotiating a treaty with the Canadian government: 
Both goals envisaged a "better" future for the Indian people in a world in 
which the white man was an increasingly significant factor. One goal 
emphasized the physical and cultural survival of the Indian people; the other 
goal emphasized improved material well-being. One strategy underlined the 
need for an alliance with the whites; the other strategy suggested the hard 
bargaining of horse-traders in the market place. 
By his own admission, Morris adopted the tactic of not agreeing to even the simplest 
demands of the Saulteaux until he had established firm control over the negotiations.^ His 
decision not to meet with them outside the Lake of the Woods and not to consider any of 
their concerns regarding construction of the Dawson Route were due in part to this strategy. 
His plan was to press for the complete surrender of land title from Lake of the Woods to the 
Rainy River area. His firmness quickly wore down the Saulteaux collective firont. 
After Morris made clear to the Saulteaux that he was prepared only to negotiate a 
treaty, not to deal with their past grievances, he announced his opening position: 
I will give you lands for your farms, and also reserves for your own use. I 
have the authority to make reserves such as described, not exceeding in all a 
square mile for every family of five or thereabouts. It may be a long time 
before the other lands are wanted, and in the meantime you will be permitted 
to fish and hunt over them. I will also establish schools whenever any bands 
asks for them, so that your children may have the learning of the white man. I 
will also give you a sum of money for yourselves and every one of your wives 
and children for this year. I will give you ten dollars per head of the 
population, and for every other year five dollars a head. But to the chief men, 
not exceeding two per band, we will give twenty dollars a year for ever. I 
^J.E. Foster, "The Saulteaux and the Numbered Treaties: An Aboriginal Rights 
Position" in The Spirit of the Alberta Indian Treaties, ed. Richard Price (Montreal: Institute 
for Research on Public Policy in association with Butterworth & Company Limited, 1980), 
163. 
^Morris, Treaties of Canada. 45. 
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will give to each of you this year a present of goods and provisions to take you 
home, and I am sure you will be satisfied.”* 
At this point, face-to-face talks between the Saulteaux and the Canadians drew to a close for 
the day. Morris had apparently been meeting with a number of chiefs secretly soon after his 
arrival at the Lake of the Woods and, as he himself reported, they began to show signs of 
increasing flexibility in their negotiating positions.”® 
Nevertheless, the next morning, Chief Ma-we-do-pe-nais responded to Morris’ 
opening statement by recognising that he was acting as the Crovra’s representative but 
asserting that the territory was Saulteaux country. 
All this is our property where you have come. We have understood you yesterday that Her 
Majesty has given you the same power and authority as she has, to act in this business; you 
said the Queen gave you her goodness, her charitableness in your hands. That is what we 
think, that the Great Spirit has planted us on this ground where we are, as you were where 
you came from. We think where we as our property. I will tell you what He said to us 
when he planted us here; the rules that we should follow to govern us rightly.^ 
Ma-we-do-pe-nais then outlined the Saulteaux negotiating position. The Saulteaux wanted 
much better annuities than Morris had offered in his opening statement. They countered by 
demanding $50 a year for chiefs; $20 per councillor; $15 per every first and second soldier 
and $10 for every ordinary band member. In addition, each ordinary member was to receive 
a special one-time payment of fifteen dollars. In addition to annuities, Ma-we-do-pe-nais 
demanded agricultural tools, seeds, domesticated animals, clothing suitable to the rank of 





and sugar.Morris acknowledged that the Saulteaux demands had changed little since 
1869, when the government first approached these people regarding a treaty.^ Not 
surprisingly, Morris rejected the counter-proposal, claiming it was larger than the one signed 
between the Chippewa and the American government at La Pointe in 1854. After listening to 
Ma-we-do-pe-nais’ reply, he threatened to leave if the chiefs did not reconsider it. Ma-we- 
do-pe-nais called Morris’ bluff by pointing out that his people had been cheated in the past 
and that they their territory was rich in mineral deposits the whites were anxious to 
exploit. 
Just when it appeared that the talks would break down, Ka-Katche-way, a chief 
representing the Lac Seul area, appears to break rank with the other Saulteaux leaders. In 
spite of the apparent split, Ka-Katche-way demanded essentially the same terms as Ma-we-do- 
pe-nais had stated the day before. This "split" remains a mystery. There is some 
speculation that this was an spontaneous act on the part of the Lac Seul chief. Nevertheless, 
Morris hinted that he knew something of Ka-katche-way’s intentions in advance. However, 
this may not have been a split at all but a carefully timed tactic on the part of the Saulteaux. 
Ka-Katche-way insisted that the government provide his people with agricultural implements 
and the technical expertise to teach them white methods of farming as well as a "school 
^°'NAC, RGIO, volume 1918, file 2790B, "Demands by the Indians as their terms for 
treaty," 2 October 1873. 
"“DIA, Annual Report. 1874. 16. 
^Daugerty, "Treaty Three Research Report", 46. 
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master to be sent to teach their children the knowledge of the white man".^ We will never 
know if, as Morris believed, this was the first sign of a break in Saulteaux resolve or whether 
their leaders were using this chief to test the position of the government. It seems odd, if the 
entire assembly of Saulteaux at the Treaty Three negotiations was intent on preventing this 
chief from meeting publicly with Morris, that they could not have prevented it even in the 
presence of the Fort Garry troops. At any rate, Morris told the chiefs that he was not 
interested in negotiating individually with the different bands and asked the Saulteaux to 
caucus on the matter. 
At this point another chief appears to have played a key role in the Treaty Three 
negotiations. Like the other chiefs, Blackstone rejected the limited terms put forward by 
Morris but recognised that this was the time to negotiate. The Saulteaux continued to 
demand ammunition, twine to make nets, agricultural implements, and the $15 cash 
payment.^ Morris thought that the Saulteaux were under pressure to accept less because 
he believed that they were in desperate need of economic assistance. He was aware of the 
recent partial failure of the wild rice crop and reports from fiir traders regarding an overall 
decline in the game population. In addition, many of the Saulteaux had not received the 
annuity of three dollars a year promised them by the Canadian government when construction 





With this "breakiiig of ranks" by some of the chiefs, face-to-face negotiations between 
the government and the Saulteaux were recessed. Both groups went into caucus to discuss 
the situation. Morris met briefly with the other Indian Commissioners to discuss the 
possibility of raising the annuity payment.^ The Saulteaux, on the other hand, had much 
to deliberate over. Little is known about their meeting except that four of the Metis working 
as translators for the Canadian government participated in their discussions. It is not clear 
whether these men were invited by the chiefs to attend their assembly or if they joined the 
meeting at the request of Morris.^ The Lieutenant-Governor, nevertheless, in his report on 
the successful negotiations claimed that he had sent the men to provide the Indians with 
"friendly advice. David McNab, a historian and former researcher for the Ontario 
Native Affairs Secretariat, has rejected the notion that the Metis played a critical role in 
influencing the Saulteaux to accept the government’s terms.This proposition ignores one 
important fact. When the negotiations went into recess, both sides were far apart. Morris 
refused to offer any new concessions to the Saulteaux who refused to budge from their 
original 1869 demands. In caucus, the Saulteau chiefs deliberated over the government’s 
final offer and finally accepted it only after James McKay and other Metis representatives 
joined in the discussions. McNab would argue that this was merely a coincidence - perhaps it 
"°Tbid. 
”*DIA, Annual Report. 1874. 16. 
"%id. 
^'°McNab, "Hearty Co-operation", 131-149. 
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was - although highly unlikely. Jean Friesen believes that the Metis were responsible for 
convincing the Saulteaux chiefs to accept the government’s final offer. 
They [the Metis] had prepared the way for the Commissioners and in the last 
48 hours of the treaty had probably b^ crucial in keeping it alive. Alexander 
Morris recognized this and in his final report payed tribute to both French and 
English Metis. The Indians themselves seemed to see a kind of tri-partite 
arrangement, not unusual in Indian alliances.^” 
At any rate, the Saulteaux returned to the negotiations after a long night of 
deliberations with the Metis to hear a new offer by the government. Morris raised the 
government’s annuity offer from ten dollars annually to twelve. The government had 
authorized him to go no higher than fifteen dollars. In addition, Morris offered the Saulteaux 
the stores they demanded, including ammunition, fishing twine, and agricultural tools. The 
Saulteaux countered with demands for clothing, carpenter’s tools and free passage on both the 
steamships and any future railroad passing through their territory.The negotiations let to 
a series of compromises except on the issue of the railroad and steam-ship passes. At this 
point, the Saulteaux asked Morris a series of questions about their future if they signed the 
agreement. They were anxious to know who would profit from the discovery of minerals, 
both on and off the reserves. They were also concerned about the size and location of 
reserves and whether they would be guaranteed good farm land and territories plentiful with 
game. They were eager to know if their relatives living across the border would qualify for 
membership in this treaty. Likewise, they wanted to how the Metis would benefit from the 
treaty. In addition, the Saulteaux were anxious to know if Canada expected them to fight in 
^”Jean Friesen, ”‘My Birthright and My Lands’: The Making of Treaty Three,” 
Proceedings of The Native Studies Conference (Brandon, Manitoba: n.p., 1981), 21. 
^‘"DIA, Annual Report. 1874. 17. 
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its army^'^ and whether the government was going to policy liquor on the reserves.^^'* 
Morris responded by telling the Sauteaux that they would only profit from royalties if 
one of their members actually discovered the mine and if it were found on reserve land. He 
said that Chippewa who had already signed treaties with the American government were 
ineligible for any monies or assistance from Canada. The Metis, on the other hand, 
represented a special case. He said this treaty was for "Indians" only but nevertheless 
promised that their concerns regarding the addition of Metis relatives would be addressed by 
the Canadian government. Morris told the Saulteaux that the government would never force 
them to fight against their will and that they would be under the same liquor laws as other 
Aboriginal peoples in Canada. The treaty was subsequently approved by the Saulteaux, 
signed on 3 October 1873, and ratified by the Dominion government on 31 October 1873.^^^ 
Following the signing ceremony at the Lake of the Woods, Dawson left for Shebandowan 
Lake to obtain the adhesion of a band not represented at the North-West Angle negotiations. 
The following spring Pither similarly obtained the adhesion of the Lac Seul band. With the 
signatures of these leaders at Lake Shebandowan and Lac Seul, in addition to those of the 
assembled chiefs at the North-West Angle, the Dominion government had successfully 
extinguished Amerindian tide to 55,000 square miles of territory west of Lake Superior along 
the Canadian / American border.^^* 
^^^Morris, Treaties of Canada. 68. 
'^%id., 70-3. 
^“DIA, Annual Report. 1874. 17. 
^'®NAC, RGIO, volume 1918, file 2790B, Order in Council, 31 October, 1877. 
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With the signing of Treaty Three, the Canadian government gained an all-Canadian 
corridor to the West and took a significant step towards exploitation of the west. The Red 
River Resistance of 1869-70 had forced the Canadian government to realize that a safe all- 
Canadian route for transportation and communication from eastern Canada to the West was 
necessary. The apparent interest in territorial expansion by the Americans made such a route 
critical and the terms by which British Columbia joined the Dominion made it essential. 
Although the Dawson Road had been constructed through the region without a treaty, it was 
clear to many (including Simon Dawson) that the Saulteaux were not prepared to allow the 
building of a railroad through their lands without a treaty. 
In spite of the threat of famine resulting from a poor wild rice crop and a decline in 
game, particularly among the rabbit population, the Saulteaux remained firm in their terms 
for a treaty. They rejected an outright land surrender in favour of safe passage through their 
territory for travellers using the Dawson route and the future railroad until the very end of 
the negotiations that led to Treaty Three. They pressed for better annuities than those given 
by the negotiators of Treaties One and Two. In addition, they wanted to receive tools and 
teachers to help them adjust to the presence of the white man in their homelands. Morris, for 
his part, rejected their demands as "excessive" until it was clear that an agreement would be 
reached. In the end, the government received its desired land title while paying the Saulteaux 
only a fraction of its true value. 
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CONCLUSION 
The successful conclusion of talks between the Saulteaux and the Canadian 
government was important for a number of reasons. After four years and numerous attempts, 
the Canadian government was finally able to convince the Saulteaux to surrender title to their 
land but it was achieved at a price. Regardless of the verbal promises made during the 
Treaty One negotiations, the Saulteaux were able to wring more concessions out of the 
Canadian government and have them included in the final draft of the text. For this reason 
alone, Treaty Three is a milestone in the Amerindian struggle to force the Canadian 
government to recognize their inherent rights as Aboriginal peoples. 
Treaty Three was important, too, for the newly appointed Lieutenant-Governor of 
Manitoba and the North-West Territories. It was the first time that Alexander Morris tested 
his negotiating ability against Amerindian determination. In his book. The Treaties of 
Canada with the Indians, he was to write that he learned many lessons during these talks with 
the Saulteaux that he later applied to the negotiations of other numbered treaties. 
One of the lessons that he learned when dealing with Amerindians was to remain in 
control during treaty negotiations. During the Treaty Three talks, he steadfastly stuck to his 
own agenda and refused to consider changing the location of the talks to an area more 
convenient for the Saulteaux. It would be a principle that he tried to apply during the later 
negotiations with Aboriginal peoples on the prairies. Nevertheless, the negotiations were 
never as one-sided as Morris would have the readers of The Treaties of Canada with the 
Indians believe. The Saulteaux forced Morris to make concessions that Amerindians had 
failed to achieve during Treaties One and Two, including better annuities, assistance in 
agricultural development and education. Was Treaty Three a personal achievement for 
Red River Metis who participated in the Treaty Three negotiations on the other. No 
agreement could have been reached without the active assistance of these people. Dawson, in 
particular, had spent over twenty years of his life learning about the Saulteaux during his 
time exploring the region with Hind, surveying and later constructing the road named in his 
honour, and finally spending four years actively seeking a comprehensive treaty with the 
Saulteaux, Although not a fur trader himself, Dawson seemed to understand the way the 
Saulteaux preferred to do things and he respected their wishes. He consistently offered 
accurate advice to the Canadian government concerning the Saulteaux and Morris, to his 
credit, appears to have been the first negotiator to have accepted it. Dawson was criticized 
by many like Simpson and Alexander Campbell for being too sympathetic to the needs and 
desires of the Saulteaux. However, Dawson was successful in reaching limited agreements 
with the Saulteaux throughout the region during his years in the Little North, largely because 
he understood these people and respected them. 
Likewise, the role of James McKay and other members of the Red River Metis 
attending the Treaty Three negotiations cannot be underestimated. They were not merely 
"translators'’ for the Canadian government but forged a middle ground between the two 
parties who shared little if anything in common. McKay, for instance, was equally 
comfortable in both worlds. He spent much of his youth living among Amerindians learning 
many of their languages and customs. As a young man, he worked for the Hudson’s Bay 
Company developing his administrative talents. He was an important leader in the Metis 
community when Moiris arrived at Fort Gany. He had been influential during the 
negotiations that led to Treaties One and Two. As the Canadian government turned to 
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Dawson to prq)are for treaty talks with the Saulteaux in 1873, so too did Morris seek the 
assistance of McKay, a man of proven ability in Manitoba, to ensure the negotiations would 
be successful. 
Wayne Daugherty suggests that Morris was able to "shame the Saulteaux into 
acceptance" by pointing out the extravagance of their first counter-proposal.^^^ However, if 
the Saulteaux felt any shame during the negotiations, it most likely occurred when one of the 
Saulteaux chiefs accused Dawson of not keeping his word during the construction of the Red 
River Route. Dawson demanded evidence of just one such incident of bad faith on his part. 
There was only silence. Credit for the achievement of a treaty with the Saulteaux largely 
belongs to Simon Dawson, on one hand and to James McKay and the Red River Metis on the 
other. For without their patience, knowledge and skill, an agreement would have been 
unlikely. 
^^Wayne E. Daugherty, "Treaty Research Report: Treaty Three.", (Ottawa: Treaties and 
Historical Research Centre, Research Branch, Corporate Policy, Department of Indian 
Affairs, Canada, 1981.), 45. 
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APPENDIX A 
"Demands made by the Indians as their terms for treaty"^ 
October 2nd 1873 
Fort Frances January 22 1869 
We, the undersignd leaders of the various bands of Indians in the vicinity of Fort Francis and 
the Lake of the Woods, will agree to make the treaty with the Queen’s Commissioners, at the 
following conditions - 
1st That every chief gets a pay of fifty dollars every year - 
2nd That every member of Council get a pay of Twenty dollars every year - 
3rd That every first soldier of each chief get a pay of fifteen dollars every year - 
4th That every second soldier of each chief gets a pay of fifteen dollars every year - 
5th That every heads of INdian men, women , and children gets a pay of $15 for the first 
payment, and every subsequent year ten dollars. 
6th That every head of Indians get a suit of clothing from the first Chief to the last Indian 
according to their rank every year - 
7th That every chief gets a double barrelled gun eveiy four years, and every man gets one 
single barrel gunnduring the same period 
8th That every chief gets 100 lbs of powder, three hundred lbs of shot, flints and caps, 
according to the quantity of munitions every year - 
9th That every Chief gets a yoke of oxen, plough, harress, and utensils for cultivation, 
every 4 years - 
10th That every chief gets ten cows and one bull every eight years - 
11th That every chief gets a team of Horse, Buggy, and Harness every four years - 
12th That every chief gets a she and a he lamb, and one sow and one boar, every four 
'PAC RGIO, Volume 1918, File 2790B, "Demands made by the Indians as their terms 
for Treaty", January 22, 1869 in Morris’ Rep|Of^ on the Treaty Three Negotiations, October 
2, 1873. 
13th That every married women gets fishing twine and cord line to make four nets every 
year - 
14th That every chief gets a set of Carpenter’s tools, (indisciperable) saws included, every 
six years - 
15th That every chief gets one cooking stove and utensils every four years - 
16th That every member of the Council, first soldiers and second grade soldiers, gets one 
box stove every four years- 
17th That every Chief gets 20 sacks of flour, 10 barrells of pork, 1 Big Chest Tea and 100 
lbs. of sugar every year - 
18th That every chief gets 30 bushels of wheat, 20 bushels peas and various kinds of 
garden seeds every four years - 
19th That every chief gets one ox, every year, and rations for all the Indians during the 
payment each year - 
20th That all the demands should last, if granted, forever, that is to say during all the time 
that an Indian will be alive in this part of the country - 
For the Land reserves of the various bands of Indians will be treated verbally from we the 
undersigned and the Queen’s Commissionners. 
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APPENDIX C 
THE PAYPOM TREATY 
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Grand Council Treaty If3 
The following are the terms of the Treaty held 
at North West Angle the Third day of October, 
Eighteen Hundred and seventy three, viz: 
1. The Government will give when Indians will 
be settled, Two hoes, one plough for every ten 
families Five harrows for every twenty fami- 
lies, one yoke of oxen, one bull and four cows 
for every band, one scythe and one axefor every 
family and enough of wheat, barley and oats 
for the land broken up; this is to encourage 
them at the beginning of their labour, once 
for all. 
2. Fifteen hundred dollars every year in twine 
and munitions. 
3. Twelve dollars for the first payment to every 
head of Indians and every subsequent year, 
Five Dollars. Twenty five Dollars to every 
chif every year. Councillor, first soldier and 
messenger Fifteen Dollars. 
The farming implements will be provided for 
during this winter to be given next year to those 
that arefarming and to those who are anxious 
to imitate the farmers, a set of carpenter tools 
will also be given. 
7. Coats will be given to the Chiefs and their 
head men every three years. With regard to the 
other Indians there is goods here to be given to 
them. 
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'8. If their children that are scattered come inside 
of two years and settle with you, they will have 
the same privilege as you have. 
9. / will recommend to the authorities at 
Ottawa, assisted by the Indian Commis- 
sioner, the half breeds that are living with you 
to have the same privilege as you have. 
10. The English Government never calls the 
Indians to assist them in their battles but he 
expects you to live in peace with red and white 
people. 
11. Mr. Dawson said he would act as by the past 
about the Indians passage in his road. The 
Indians will be free as by the past for their 
hunting and rice harvest. 
12. If some gold or silver mines be found in their 
reserves, it will he to the ben fit of the Indians 
but if the Indiansfind any gold or silver mines 
out of their reserves they will surely be paid the 
finding of the mines. 
13. The Commissioner and an agent will come to 
an understanding with the Indians about the 
reserve, and shall be surveyed by the Govern- 
ment. The Commissioners don't wish that the 
Indians leave their harvest immediately to step 
into their reserve. 
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14. About the Indian Commissioner, the Com- 
mission is pending upon the authorities at 
Ottawa. I will write to Ottawa and r^er 
Mr. Charles Nolin. 
15. There will be no sale of liquor in this part of 
Canadian Territory. It is the greatest pleasure 
for me to hear you and when we shake hands it 
must be for ever. It will be the duty of the 
English Government to deal with the Com- 
missioners if they act wrong towards the 
Indians. I will give you a copy of the Agree- 
ment now and when I reach my residence I 
will send you a copy in parchment. 
16. You will get rations during the time of the 
payment every year. 
17. The Queen will have her policemen to preserve 
order and whenever there is crime and murder 
the guilty must be punished. 
18. This Treaty will last as long as the sun will 




Elder Paypom explains how he obtained the 
document as follows: 
Linde was a photographer and a friend to the 
Indian people. One day, about forty or fifty years 
ago, he told me he had a paper and the Govern- 
ment wanted to buy it from him. He said th^ 
would give him $5, 000.00 for it. But he 
wanted me to have it, ^ for your children” he 
said. 
That winter I saved all the money from my 
trapline. My family had a very hard winter that 
year because I saved that money, but my wife 
never complained. She was a great woman, and 
she understood that the paper had on it the 
promises made to the people by the Government, 
and th^ were breaking those promises. 
I saved my money and in the spring I gave it to 
Linde. He moved south, but he sent me a parcel 
in the mail. He sent it like a parcel of clothes so 
nobody would suspect it was the treaty. 
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The ”Pay pom Document” is an original set of 
notes madefor Chief Powasson at the signing of the 
1873 treaty between the 0jibway Indians and the 
government of Canada at North West Angle on 
Lake of the Woods, The notes differ in many 
respectsfrom the printed version of the treaty which 
was delivered to the signatories by government 
officials sometime later. Recent treaty research 
indicates that the printed version may have been 
written a year bfore the 1873 North West Angle 
negotiations. 
The notation below appears in pencil on the back 
of the original. 
This copy was given to me in 1906 by Chief 
Powasson at Bukety — the Northwest Angle — 
Lake of the Woods. 
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(signed) 
C. G. Linde 
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